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1 (3REW0RD
The Otterbein Miscellany is published once or twice a year as 
an outlet for faculty writing on a wide variety of topics. The 
college underwrites this publication in the belief that it will 
help maintain a genuine community of scholars. Papers are 
accepted, therefore, on the basis of their interest to the whole 
academic community rather than to members of a particular 
discipline. Editorial responsibility rests with a committee of the 
faculty.
Contributions are considered from the Otterbein College 
faculty and administration, active and emeritus — others on 
invitation only.
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THE WORD
In an essay titled “Retreat from the Word,” the British scholar, 
George Steiner, writes:
Erasmus tells of how he bent down in a muddy lane ecstati­
cally when his eye lit upon a scrap of print, so new was the 
miracle of the printed page. This is how the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries seem to look upon language itself. 
The great treasure of it lies before them, suddenly unlocked, 
and they ransack it with a sense of infinite resource. The 
instrument now in our hands, on the contrary, is worn by long 
usage. And the demands of mass culture and mass communi­
cation have made it perform tasks of ever increasing 
tawdriness.
Like the fish which is constantly immersed in water, modern 
man is constantly immersed in the word. The printed word, the 
flashed word, the blared and garbled word has become our element, 
and as our element we assume it rather than give it thought. 
Steiner’s lament is justified. We live in an age of the new 
illiteracy.
But merely lamenting this condition achieves little. A main 
function of the writer, the scholar, the teacher, is to alter this 
condition, to reflect through his or her own attentiveness to the 
word a respect for “the wide magnificence of its legacy.” 
Admittedly, a verbal matrix is only one in which the articulations 
and conduct of the mind are conceivable. But as Eliot aptly notes 
in one of his poems, “I gotta use words when I talk to you.” In 
talking to you through the pages of this publication, its contri­
butors strive to hone the word to its finest precision and make it 
tell.
This is the tenth annual appearance of The Otterbein Miscel­
lany. As we look forward to a second decade of publication, we 
gratefully acknowledge those editors, contributors, readers, 
typists, printers, and financial supporters who have made this 
yearly venture possible. The debt we owe them even words cannot 
weigh.
Ill
The Editor
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Paul L. Redditt
METHOD OF DETERMINING AETHENTIC SAYINGS OF JESES 
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TASK FOR THE CHRISTIAN
Introduction
At first sight this topic looks superfluous. After all, the 
gospels are full of notable sayings attributed to Jesus. In fact, 
part of the problem is the embarrassing richness of sayings, 
especially in Matthew and Luke in contrast with John. As in 
other areas, the distinction between the synoptics and the 
Johannine traditions is pronounced with regard to the teaching of 
Jesus. Did he speak in short parables with a pragmatic, rather 
condensed style (as in Mark and Q^), or did he speak in more 
allegorical parables which open up into expressions nearly 
approaching philosophy and metaphysics (as in John)? Either 
style alone would probably be accorded authenticity'^ by scholars, 
so well written are the teachings. The two together, though, have 
caused most critical scholars to ask: * Which, if either, is the 
real style of Jesus’ preaching?” Even when all four gospels 
record the same event, for example the feeding of the five thou­
sand, the accompanying discourses are usually markedly different 
in style.
Beyond the problem of the richness of texts is the problem 
raised by form criticism of the gospels. Karl Ludwig Schmidt, in 
his epoch-making Z)er Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu, 1919, showed 
that the framework of the gospels was theologically, not chrono­
logically, inspired. Hence the sequence of events and perspec­
tives on Jesus varies from gospel to gospel and is not evidence 
for the writing of a biography of Jesus. Rudolph Bultmann, in his 
History of the Synoptic Tradition, 1932, showed that many, if not 
most, of the details of the gospel narratives follow certain 
stereotyped, literary styles and, hence, cannot simply be assumed 
to be historically accurate in every detail. In addition, Martin 
Dibelius, in his From Tradition to Gospel, showed that the 
narratives and accounts of Jesus’ preaching were preserved 
because of and shaped in accordance with specific needs 
addressed by early Christian preaching. The import of all this 
work can be summarized thus: what the **historical Jesus’’"^ 
did and what he said may be entirely lost in what the church 
said about him during the forty to seventy years immediately
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following his death, i.e. the time between the crucifixion and 
the writing of the gospels. It is, therefore, no longer sufficient 
when asking historical questions to reply that Jesus could have 
said or done thus-and-so. The materials as we have them are 
demonstrably the product of a later age.
Some scholars have been content to ignore form criticism 
(though the number of such people is rapidly diminishing) and 
proceed to biblical study, talking about history but refusing to 
employ the tools of the historian. On the opposite side are those 
who have been content to abandon the question of what Jesus did 
and said and refuse to study the relation between Jesus and the 
tradition about him. Increasingly, however, scholarship is address­
ing the questions: How does one get behind the sources to 
rediscover the historical Jesus? And, what is the relationship 
between the results of their scholarship and Christian faith? I 
shall take up these questions in sequence; the first in sections 
I and II, the second in section III. If scholars no longer suppose 
that they can write a chronology of Jesus’ life and sayings, they 
do, nevertheless, attempt to form an impression of the man and 
what he stood for. Since this would be easier to discern in what 
he said than in the more ambiguous data of what he did, scholars 
have done far more work on the sayings of Jesus than on his 
deeds^ and, accordingly, have worked out a precise, but limited 
methodology.
/. Criteria for Determining Authentic Sayings of Jesus
We are now in the fortunate position that Norman Perrin^ has 
drawn together the basic criteria used in researching the sayings 
of Jesus. Perrin begins with those teachings ascribed to Jesus 
which have multiple attestation (that is, which appear in more 
than one gospel). He argues that one should first write a history 
of those traditions (cf. Bultmann’s work), seeking to establish 
the earliest form of each tradition. Once this earliest form is 
arrived at — that is, once as much later accretion as possible has 
been removed — it is possible to apply three criteria to determine 
if a given saying is authentic. I shall review them one at a time.
The first of these criteria is the oldest. I am aware of its use 
as early as the second quarter of the nineteenth century by D. F. 
Strauss in his Das Leben Jesu. Perrin calls it the “criterion of 
dissimilarity.” He says:
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Recognizing that it follows an attempt to write a history of 
the tradition concerned, we may formulate it as follows: the 
earliest form of a saying we can reach may be regarded as 
authentic if it can be shown to be dissimilar to character­
istic emphases both of ancient Judaism and of the early 
church, and this will particularly be the case where 
Christian tradition oriented towards Judaism can be shown 
to have modified the saying away from its original empha­
sis.*^
An excellent example of the use of this criterion can be found in 
Joachim Jeremias’ work on the Hebrew word ''abba’ in the New 
Testamento^ After an investigation of Jewish tradition, Jeremias 
concludes that "abba,” translated “father,” but really much 
closer to the infantile expression “dada,” is unthinkable as a 
name for God in the mouths of pious Jews who guarded and 
revered the name of God so highly they would not even pronounce 
the proper Hebrew form Yahweh. Moreover, abba is used outside 
the prayers of Jesus only in Romans 8:15 and Galatians 4:6, where 
Paul apparently used the formula because as a Jew he appreciated 
its significance.^ In no sense, however, did the term abba gain 
acceptance in Christian circles, so, being neither of Jewish nor of 
early Christian origin, it can only have come from Jesus himself.
The first criterion, that of dissimilarity, is dependent upon 
the scholar’s knowledge of Judaism and early Christianity. 
Moreover, it cannot take into account the traditions of groups 
whose thinking has not survived. Accordingly, the results of this 
criterion are rather limited and are not entirely assured, though 
any saying determined authentic by this procedure has consider­
able claim to authenticity. The second criterion is designed to 
apply to passages which under the first criterion would be 
determined inauthentic. This criterion is called the criterion of 
coherence.” Perrin explains that “material from the earliest 
strata of the tradition may be accepted as authentic if it can be 
shown to cohere with material established as authentic by means 
of the criterion of dissimilarity.”^^ Again I turn to Jeremias for 
an example of this method. He finds eight basic images in the 
parabolic teachings of Jesus (which are generally agreed to 
have been largely authentic in their earliest form and which 
evidence a discernible pattern of growth which Jeremias traces 
in seven steps). These categories are “The Great Assurance,” 
“Now is the Day of Salvation,” “God’s Mercy for Sinners,” 
“The Imminence of Catastrophe,” “The Challenge of Crisis,” 
“Realized Discipleship,” “The Via Dolorosa of the Son of Man,” 
and “The Consummation.” Under the basic category “Realized
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Discipleship,” Jeremias discusses the key parables of the 
Treasure in the Field and the Pearl found in Matthew 11:44-46. 
The primary emphasis, he says, is upon the joy in finding the 
treasure. No price is too great to pay to obtain the treasure.^^ 
I will now apply the insight of Jeremias to a new text. In 
Mark 9:43-49 we find a saying which makes the same point 
in antithetical fashion: pay any price, even maim yourself, 
rather than suffer damnation. Bultmann argues that the original 
construction mentioned neither the foot, nor was it specific 
concerning the right hand, etc. In this truncated form, I would 
argue, we may on the basis of the criterion of coherence consider 
the saying authentic.
It should be obvious that the criterion of coherence is valid 
only in so far as the criterion of dissimilarity is employed and is 
valid. Nevertheless, its usefulness as a means for rounding out 
the teaching of Jesus should not be denigrated. Much less 
reliable standard for determining authenticity is the “criterion of 
multiple attestation.” Perrin explains: “This is a proposal to 
accept as authentic material which is attested in all, or most, of 
the sources which can be discerned behind the synoptic 
gospels.Moreover, the “usefulness of this criterion is 
somewhat restricted. It will not often help with specific sayings, 
but only with general motifs, and, consequently, will tend to be 
more useful in arriving at general characteristics of the ministry 
and teaching of Jesus than at specific elements in the teaching 
itself.”^^
Up to this point Perrin has dealt only with synoptic traditions 
whose history can be written. His fourth criterion is proposed as 
a way to work with isolated synoptic traditions whose history 
cannot be written because they appear only once. It is merely a 
judicious application of the three previously mentioned criteria.
Perrin is convinced that there are three aspects of the teach­
ing of Jesus which can be reconstructed beyond reasonable 
doubt. These are the parables (cf. the above-mentioned works by 
Jeremias), perhaps not all, but a vast number; the teaching about 
the imminent coming of the Kingdom of God (cf. the late nine­
teenth century masterpiece by Johannes Weiss, available now in 
English under the title Jesus’ Proclamation of the Kingdom of 
God); and the Lord’s Prayer tradition. On the other hand Perrin 
rejects the Gospel of John as a source for authentic traditions.
He justifies this rejection in a manner representative of most
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biblical scholars: “It is generally recognized that it represents 
a reinterpretation of the ministry and teaching of Jesus along 
markedly theological lines.”^^ Until a history of the Johannine 
tradition is written, Perrin thinks work cannot progress far with 
John.
II. Critique of the Methodology for Determining Authenticity
In summary to this point, Perrin’s four criteria are (1) the 
criterion of dissimilarity, (2) the criterion of coherence, (3) the 
criterion of multiple attestation — all in cases where it is 
possible to write a history of the traditions — and (4) careful 
application of these three criteria in special, isolated sayings.
I wish now to offer three criticisms about the current methodology.
The first objection concerns the use of the Fourth Gospel as 
a historical source. It is now also widely recognized that each 
of the synoptics has its own point of view; it is not possible to 
attribute to any of them an exclusive or even predominant concern 
to write history or biography in the modern sense of those words. 
Hence, the problems encountered in studying John are no different 
from those involved in assessing the special Matthean and 
special Lukan source materials which have no parallels and with 
which Perrin is willing to work. While it may not be possible to 
find in John very many unaltered sayings of Jesus, there are 
materials which cohere with synoptic material; for example, in 
both Mark 14:58 and John 2:19 Jesus is quoted as predicting the 
destruction of the Temple and its subsequent rebuilding in three 
days.^^ If Bultmann is correct about the authenticity of Mark 
14:58, then by coherence John 2:19 should also be held authentic. 
Such materials should not be omitted simply because they occur 
in John.
The two remaining criticisms are directed at the use of the 
criterion of dissimilarity. One has already been intimated. The 
validity of the criterion rests upon the assumption that enough is 
known about Judaism and Christianity in first century Palestine 
to determine whether a given passage could have been at home in 
either context. As a matter of fact, the New Testament itself is 
virtually the only surviving witness to early Christianity, and 
except for the documents from the Qumran community on the Dead 
Sea^° and a few apocryphal books (most of which are likely not 
from Palestine) very little remains of Jewish thought from the 
first century which is not overlaid with subsequent commentary —
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just like the words of Jesus. Certainly the task of uncovering 
first century rabbinic thought from the Talmud is incomplete. 
Hence, unrestricted confidence in the so-called ‘‘negative 
criterion’’ (criterion of dissimilarity) is not strictly warranted.
The last critique which I would raise against current method­
ology is somewhat more involved. I simply must protest what I 
would call the “tyranny of the negative criterion.” On the one 
hand, this criterion gives us materials with the highest claim to 
probable authenticity, and scholars must continue to use it 
despite the shortcomings which I mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. On the other hand, the sayings granted authenticity by 
the use of this criterion tend by the nature of the methodology to 
be the most extreme statements attributed to Jesus. Perrin says: 
‘Tf we are to seek that which is most characteristic of Jesus, it 
will be found not in the things which he shares with his contem­
poraries, but in the things wherein he differs from them.”^^ 
The word “characteristic” in this statement is questionable. 
If by “characteristic” we mean “major emphasis,” we have 
no assurance at all that the negative criterion can deliver 
that to us. It can produce a picture of the distinctive teachings of 
Jesus and that is all, but some of these teachings may well have 
been peripheral. He surely shared many common ideas with his 
own Jewish people and the early church; and these teachings may 
have been far more representative of his overall teaching than the 
distinctive concepts retrievable through the use of the criterion 
of dissimilarity.
Nor is this a vain warning, for the danger in the use of the 
negative criterion is the tendency to use it exclusively. A clear 
example of this abuse is the work of the New Testament scholar 
Ernst Kiisemann. He has isolated a large collection of special 
sayings lying behind the First Gospel.Many of these sayings 
do, no doubt, stem from the early church, because they reflect 
matters affecting the organized church such as persecution and 
the position of Peter. Moreover, these materials are apocalyptic^ ^ 
in content; they expect imminent judgment. By exclusive use of 
the negative criterion, therefore, Kasemann is able to argue that 
apocalyptic theology is the earliest Christian theology and 
therefore may not be attributed to Jesus. Jesus cannot have been 
an apocalypticist. It seems to me that Kasemann has pressed his 
methodology too far.^^ The most he can claim by the exclusive 
use of the negative criterion is that one may not without further 
question attribute these sayings to Jesus.
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Kasemann’s argument can be reduced to absurdity by turning 
it upon the scholar himself. He is perhaps the most illustrious 
student of Rudolf Bultmann, and Kasemann himself has a number 
of disciples — myself included. If one asks what the ‘‘historical 
Kasemann” says and employs Kasemann’s methodology to answer 
that question, Kasemann can have said nothing that he took 
directly from Bultmann or that Kasemann’s students have taken 
directly from him! Poor Kasemann; the author of a steady stream 
of books and articles for years, and yet he has hardly an authentic 
word in the whole corpus. As a teacher I am well aware that 
students can totally misunderstand what I say, but they can also 
understand very well, or repeat to me the ipsissima verba of a 
given lecture to prove a different point. One should keep this in 
mind when one seeks to determine authenticity in the gospels. 
Sayings which do not reflect a post-Easter context and at the 
same time cannot pass the criterion of dissimilarity should be 
put in a kind of historical limbo, not denied to Jesus altogether.
In fact, I would go further to “resurrect” a methodological 
procedure employed between the world wars by Shirley Jackson 
Case of the University of Chicago. Case argued that if a saying 
betrayed Jewish back^ounds, it should be considered authentic; 
if Greek, inauthentic.^^ This position was informed by a view of 
early church history that to me is not tenable, namely that a 
complete hiatus existed between the simple proclamation of 
Jesus and the gospel after its accomodation to the Greek thought 
world of the church; so I do not wish to employ the methodology 
unaltered. However, I do think that the Jewishness of Jesus 
ought to be taken more fully into account in the reconstruction of 
his proclamation. I see two^^ currents of first century Judaism 
from which Jesus very likely drew some of his teachings. First, 
I concur with that group of scholars beginning with Johannes 
Weiss and Albert Schweitzer who view the unquestionably 
authentic proclamation of the kingdom of God as essentially 
apocalyptic. Second, it has long been recognized that some of 
the sayings attributed to Jesus reveal a striking similarity to 
teachings recorded in the vast rabbinic literature.An opinion 
on their authenticity must be based on the nature of Jesus’ 
contact with the rabbis. John Bowker has recently argued that 
the Pharisees of the New Testament constituted only an extremist 
position among the mixed group of teachers whose ideas were 
eventually more or less consolidated and became authoritative 
after the second century. He places Jesus in a specific historical 
succession and puts his finger on the chief issue of disagreement 
between Jesus and the less extreme among the teachers:
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It is probable that originally Jesus was sufficiently 
close to the Hillelite tendency to believe that the expecta­
tion of God must first be established among the people whom 
God had chosen, before it could be extended to others; but 
his discovery that faith could be as real and as consequen­
tial among non-Jews as among Jews led to the obvious 
conclusion that the unity of effect between God and men is 
possible anywhere - indeed greater faith can sometimes be 
seen among non-Jews than, ironically, among Jews who 
ought (in view of their history) to have been vastly more 
expectant of the action and effect of God.26
I would extend this assessment. It seems to me that Jesus 
also taught that God forgives and accepts people, freeing them to 
live godly lives, while the rabbis thought that deeds must precede 
and in some sense prove faith. This difference of opinion resulted 
in sharp antagonism between Jesus and rabbis of several 
varieties, and this antagonism only increased during the early 
history of the church. In view of the foregoing, I would argue that 
sayings of Jesus which seem to rely on rabbinic thought should 
not be determined inauthentic for that reason alone. In fact, in 
view of the growing tension between Judaism and her offspring 
church, I think that sayings which show influence of the rabbis 
should be considered authentic if they are altered in the history 
of the New Testament tradition, or if they do not presuppose the 
death of Jesus and/or the existence of the organized church. 
One example will suffice. There is a rabbinic parallel to the 
proverb attributed to Jesus in Mark 2:27. The parallel reads:
The Sabbath was given to you, not you to the Sabbath.’’ Despite 
this saying the Pharisees at least took issue with what Jesus 
did on the Sabbath, and the disciples’ refusal to follow various 
rites only aggravated the fissure. Moreover, Bultmann has shown 
that 2:28 is a secondary expansion by the church defending 
Jesus’ (and the church’s) right to ignore the Sabbath law. Here 
then is a proverb which is probably more at home in the teachings 
of Jesus than among many of the rabbis and which the church 
found it necessary to modify by making more explicit in its 
ongoing debate with the synagogue. I would, therefore, argue that 
Mark 2:27 has a real claim to authenticity.
III. The Significance of the Task of Uncovering the Sayings 
of Jesus
An attempt to recover Jesus’ teaching is simply a way of 
getting into the larger question of who and what Jesus was, said.
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and did. Not all biblical scholars have been inclined to involve 
themselves in the so-called quest for the historical Jesus. 
Certainly many “conservative” scholars have condemned the 
enterprise, and many “liberal” scholars have eschewed the task 
as well. (Note the remark of Martin Kahler: “Therefore, Christian 
faith and history of Jesus repel each other like oil and water . .
. .”^®) Surely it is not correct to say that Christian salvation is 
dependent upon the imminent solution of the problem encountered 
in this research. Nevertheless, the task is not inimical to 
Christian faith, and in a day of literalism and historical aware­
ness it is at least an inevitable task and, perhaps, an absolutely 
necessary endeavor. I intend, therefore, to assess the signifi­
cance of this task by indicating what it cannot do on the one 
hand and what it can do on the other.
Harvey K. McArthur summarizes the insufficiency of historical 
research in two statements: (1) historical facts cannot demon­
strate the validity of Christian theological claims, and (2) there 
is inevitably a gap between what the historical Jesus did and 
said and what historians qua historians can prove about him.^^ 
I will comment upon these observations in reverse order. The 
lack of agreement among scholars concerning what may or may 
not be attributed to Jesus is conclusive enough evidence that 
the picture of Jesus which emerges from historical investigation 
is incomplete. This is inevitable, however, since the historian 
must assume an “I’m from Missouri; you must show me” attitude. 
He works on the basis of common sense, analogy, and verified 
or verifiable data. He organizes his material by discerning 
certain key events on the basis of human causality and develop­
ment. If one then postulates a person who is without analogy, who 
is held to be perfect and, hence, above development, such a 
person is beyond historical verifiability. If the principal causality 
discerned behind his deeds is God, the poverty of the historian’s 
tools to evaluate this claim becomes even clearer. Naturally, 
then, if the historian is limited as a historian by his tools, his 
picture of Jesus must be truncated when compared to the New 
Testament’s confession about him.
The other statement by McArthur now makes more sense. The 
New Testament claims far more about Jesus than that he did or 
said thus and so. It claims that in Christ (for Paul another name 
for Jesus)^^ God was at work reconciling the world unto himself 
(II Corinthians 5:19). This kind of statement is theology, not 
history. There is no way known to man rationally or historically
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to prove even the existence of God, let alone that he was acting 
in a certain man or event. The theological claims of the Bible, 
then, are not susceptible to proof by the historian. The results of 
historical criticism cannot, therefore, be used to reduce the 
element of risk involved in faith. Are, then, the theological 
claims of the Bible susceptible to disproof? The answer to this 
question is yes and no. The claim that God became incarnate in 
the man Jesus could be historically disproved if it could be 
shown that the man Jesus never existed. On the other hand, the 
claim could still be made that God is actively seeking to recon­
cile his world, but the historical element of the biblical faith 
would be lost.^^ (This historical element is a key feature of the 
biblical confession, though the texts are not secular historio­
graphy as such and may not be attempting to describe mundane 
events. I will return shortly to the nature of much of the New 
Testament’s presentation of Jesus.)
If historical research cannot demonstrate the validity of 
Christian theological claims and can only provide a truncated 
picture of what Jesus said and did, why engage in the study at 
all? What are the possible benefits from such an enterprise? I 
would suggest that at least five positive results derive from it. 
The first benefit of historical research is that it forces us to face 
up to what faith is. It is not the surety of sight, available to any 
disinterested observer. It requires a leap, a risk. It requires 
seeing more in Jesus than the religious and political leaders who 
plotted his death were able to see. But, faith in this sense is a 
far different thing than forcing oneself to believe logical nonsense 
or what one knows is not true. Moreover, it is the desire to 
communicate this “more” that dominates the New Testament’s 
picture of Jesus. The gospel traditions began among people who 
knew the man Jesus, and the traditions were carried along with 
and were selected from a multitude of stories about what Jesus 
did and said. The biblical traditions were chosen precisely 
because of their insight into the “moreness” of Jesus, because 
they pictured Jesus not just as he was when alive, but as he is 
for all time, especially for the church in its sufferings and 
development.
This means, then, that the church did not make the kind of 
distinction I am making, the distinction between the historical 
Jesus and the Christ of faith; it had no need to do so. It required 
after the scandal of the cross to know about the conquering 
Christ. Thus the church was willing to let the historical Jesus
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recede into the background in favor of the “contemporary” 
Christ, the Lord of the church who gave it direction and meaning. 
While we admit that interpretation is what makes the historical 
Jesus meaningful, we cannot give up the historical Jesus. Other­
wise our theology loses its historical dimension and becomes 
docetic.^^ Accordingly, I cannot accept Bultmann’s hiatus 
between research and faith and his concommitant assertion that 
any attempt to do historical reconstruction smacks of “works,” 
not faith.
The second benefit from the historical enterprise under 
discussion here is that it can help us to understand the mytho­
logical/symbolical nature of the texts with which we are dealing. 
The history of reaction to historical studies from the eighteenth 
century to the present shows that much of the church understands 
the gospels as documents of scientific observation rather than a 
confession of faith. We grow up using both discursive and 
religious language and fail to see that there is a difference 
between them. Religious language is mythological, that is, it is 
language about the God(s). When the church talks about the 
unique presence of God in the man Jesus it is using mythological, 
not scientific language. To fail to ask the question of the “his­
torical Jesus” is to fail to discern the nature of the gospels. 
They are written “that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, 
the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his 
name” (John 20:31). They are not written to tell the story of a 
man, though they obviously tell us some things about him. If we 
must recognize the mythological/symbolical nature of the gospels 
and religious language in general, we must also recognize that 
our attempt to retell the story is also mythological/symbolic. To 
say “God is my Father” is a qualitatively different statement 
from saying “Paul Leonard Redditt was my father.”
The other three benefits from historical research arise out of 
the truncated picture of Jesus which we get. (1) We who have 
never known Jesus in the flesh get an impression of the kind of 
person Jesus was in terms of his sayings and deeds. We can see 
the kind of man about whom the early church did its theologizing. 
We can see the leap of faith that the disciples were wi Ring to 
make, but others were not. Seeing that leap we are in a better 
position to judge whether we also wish to make that leap. The 
question of faith has been phrased in the following manner: To be 
a Christian is it necessary to believe things about Jesus that he 
might not have believed about himself? I can give no definitive
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answer to that question, but I can say that I do hold such beliefs. 
(2) Historical research can help us to see what Jesus actually 
believed about God. That is surely of interest to the believer. 
While Christology may well be a concern of the post-Easter faith 
(as Bultmann tells us), the Christian conception of God takes its 
characteristic formulation in the proclamation of Jesus about 
forgiveness and is passed on in the church by Paul and other 
interpreters of the Christian faith. (3) To see clearly the distinc­
tions and the similarities between Jesus and the early church is 
to put us in contact with the bedrock of Christian theology and 
its initial steps at reformulation in different contexts. This is 
indispensable in making our own interpretation biblical in the 
fullest sense.
Summary
I have attempted to use an introduction into the use of and a 
critique of a widely-accepted methodology in New Testament 
criticism to open the larger question of the limits and values of 
historical study of the Bible. I can only conclude that historical 
research is not merely insufficient as a basis for faith, but also 
is beneficial to faith by helping us see what faith is. Whether it 
is beneficial or not, however, the study will continue. Among a 
people who have an understanding of history, sooner or later the 
question of history must be directed to any document that has had 
the profound impact of the Bible. I have no doubt that the Bible 
will survive, even if the inquiry should turn into an assault.
FOOTNOTES
iThe term “Synoptic Gospels” designates the first three gospels, 
Matthew, Mark, and Luke, in recognition of their remarkable agreement, 
often word for word in subject, order of events, and language. This 
agreement is especially notable when these gospels are compared with 
John.
2“Q” is a siglum used to designate an alleged source standing 
behind Matthew and Luke. When one compares these gospels with Mark, 
one discovers many more sayings of Jesus than those recorded in Mark, 
most of which sayings agree word for word. The best explanation for 
this phenomenon is the assumption that both gospels employ the same 
source. In short, then, 0 is the sayings (without accompanying actions) 
common to Matthew and Luke, but not in Mark. The siglum itself derives 
from the German word "Quelle/* “well” or “source,” by which it was 
originally designated. While the existence of 0 is not proved in the 
sense that a copy of it has been discovered, such a collection of
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sayings has been discovered, the Gnostic Gospel of Thomas. For a list 
of major sayings in Q, see R. M. Grant, Historical Introduction to the 
New Testament (New York and Evanston, 1963), p. 114.
^The terms “authentic” and “inauthentic” are easily misunderstood, 
for they appear to evaluate the worth or even legitimacy of any passage 
to which they are ascribed. Actually, though, the terms mean only to 
indicate whether a passage or saying was likely to have been expressed 
by the person(s) to whom it has been attributed. To say that a saying of 
Jesus is inauthentic is merely to render the judgment that it is a saying 
of the church read back into the preaching of Jesus.
^The historian attempts to work first of all in terms of data from the 
past which have been established by objective standards. “Consequently 
the expression ‘historical Jesus’ comes to mean ‘What can be known of 
Jesus of Nazareth by means of the scientific methods of the historian.’ 
Thus we have to do with a technical expression which must be recog­
nized as such, and not automatically identified with the simple term 
‘Jesus’.” James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus, 
Studies in Biblical Theology, vol. XXV (London, 1959), pp. 26-7.
notable exception is the work of Ernst Fuchs, “Die Frage nach 
dem historischen Jesus,” Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, LIII 
(1956), 210-19, and other articles.
^Rediscovering the Teachings of Jesus (New York and Evanston, 
1967).
'71 bid., p. 39.
^Joachim Jeremias, The Central S[essage of the New Testament (New 
York, 1965), pp. 9-30.
^Ihid., p. 15. 
l^Perrin, p. 43.
^^The Parables of Jesus, trans. by S. H. Hooke (New York, 1955),
p. 88:
“1. There is the early appearance of a tendency to elaborate the 
parables.
2. The primitive church has largely transferred to the community 
parables which were originally addressed to opponents or to the 
crowd.
3. Hence there has occurred a frequent shifting of emphasis to the 
hortatory aspect, especially from the eschatological to the hortatory.
4. The primitive Church related the parables to its own actual situation, 
characterized by the Gentile environment, the Gentile mission, and 
the delay of the parousia [second coming]; in terms of this situation 
the Church interpreted and expanded the parables.
5. The primitive Church increasingly tended to interpret the parables 
allegorically with a hortatory purpose.
6. The primitive Church formed collections of parables, and this gave 
rise to the fusion of parables.
7. The primitive Church gave a setting to the parables, and this often 
produced a change in the meaning; in particular, by the addition of 
generalizing conclusions, many parables acquired a universal 
meaning.”
^^Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, p. 140.
1 ^Rudolf Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. by John 
Marsh, 2nd ed. (New York and Evanston, 1968), pp. 86, 312.
1 “^Perrin, p. 45. Th ese sources are several. First there are the 
traditions inherited by Mark. In addition there are Q (see note 2), and
13
two special sources available to Luke and to Matthew respectively. 
This hypothesis concerning gospel sources has been widely accepted 
among biblical scholars, though certain of its provisions have recently 
come under attack by W'illiam R. Farmer, The Synoptic Problem (New 
York and London, 1964).
1 ^Perrin, pp. 46-47.
16Perrin, p. 48.
l^See Bultmann’s discussion of the probable ultimate origin of the 
concept and the dominical use of the statement in History of the Synop­
tic Tradition, pp. 120-1.
l^For a good, non-technical summary of scholarly investigation of 
the Qumran community and its literature see James A. Sanders, “The 
Dead Sea Scrolls — A Quarter Century of Study,” Biblical Archaeologist, 
XXXVI (1973), 110-48.
19perrin, p. 39.
20These materials, scattered throughout Matthew, are largely legal 
in nature. Their structure involves the naming of an improper type of 
conduct in a dependent clause and the threat of judgment upon the 
disobedient at the end of time in an independent clause. This article 
appeared first as “Die Anfange christlicher Theologie,” in Zeitschrift 
fur Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 162-85. It evoked instant
response by Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs, to whom Kasemann in 
turn addressed a rebuttal. All four articles are collected and translated 
in the Journal for Theology and the Church, VI (1969), 17-133. Rudolf 
Bultmann also entered the fray with an article “1st die Apokalyptik die 
Mutter der christliche Theologie?” in Festschrift fur Ernst Haenchen 
(Berlin, 1964), pp. 64-69. His only disagreement concerned the term 
“apocalyptic.” Bultmann preferred to designate “eschatological” the 
theology Kasemann described. On the definitions of these terms see the 
next note.
2lThe term “apocalyptic” derives from a particular genre of Jewish- 
Christian literature. An apocalypse combines a panoramic view of 
history or heaven with a subsequent exhortation based upon that pano­
rama. (Cf. Klaus Koch, Ratios vor der Apokalyptik [Cutersloh, 1970].) 
Examples of the genre “apocalypse” are the biblical books Daniel and 
Revelation. “Apocalyptic” is a term to designate the theological per­
spective of those books and other writings sharing their world-view. A 
prominent feature of apocalyptic theology is its eschatology, its view of 
the end-time. Specifically, apocalyptic eschatology seems always to 
have expected an imminent end of the present world aeon.
22See Kasemann’s insistence that only the negative criterion is 
allowable in “The Problem of the Historical Jesus,” Essays on New 
Testament Themes, trans. by W. J. Montague (London, 1964), p. 37.
Jesus: A New Biography (Chicago, 1928), p. 115.
24,t may be that a third group should be included here, the Zealots; 
see S. G. F. Brandon, Jesus and the Zealots (New York, 1967), who 
argues: (1) Jesus was condemned as a self-proclaimed Messiah; (2) he 
must have opposed Rome in order to gain a following; (3) the Zealots 
also opposed Rome, and several of Jesus’ disciples were numbered 
among the Zealots; (4) therefore, Jesus was a Zealot and biblical 
statements in which he disclaimed political intentions are to be under­
stood as the apology of the church in its Roman setting. There is no 
doubt that the sources can be forced to this conclusion, but it seems 
more likely to me that Jesus himself was the source for the New
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Testament’s reinterpretation of the political messianic concept, either 
by what he said or — more likely — by his refusal to mount armed attack 
against Rome. There is, however, no doubt that he was considered 
seditious by Rome and was executed as an agitator, potential or actual. 
To admit this, however, does not mean that the connection with the 
Zealots is assured or even implied.
2^See especially the massive work of H. L. Strack and P. Billerbeck, 
Kommenlcir zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch, 4 vols. 
(Munich, 1922-8).
^^John Bowker, Jesus and the Pharisees (Cambridge, 1973), p. 44. 
The phrase “Hillelite tendency” is a reference to the less harsh of two 
dominant rabbis who flourished from about 30 B.C. to A.D. 10.
^^The limits of my agreement and disagreement with Bultmann can be 
seen by comparing this paragraph with Bultmann s view in his History 
of the Synoptic Tradition, pp. 49-30.
^^The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ, 
trans. by Carl E. Braaten (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 74.
‘^ ^In Search of the Historical Jesus (New York, 1969), pp. 18-19.
3^See, for example, Adolf Deissmann, Paul: a Study in Social and 
Religious History, trans. by William E. Wilson (New York, 1957), p. 191.
^^Harvey K. McArthur, The Quest through the (Philadelphia,
1966), pp. 136-39.
^^Docetism was an early heresy with which the church had to 
contend. Certain Christians embued with the Greek concept that the body 
was the prison for the soul held that Christ could have had no physical 
body. They claimed, instead, that he only seemed to have a body. The 
appellation for this view, docetism, is derived from the Greek word 
dokeo, which means to “seem” or “have the appearance of.
^^On this whole question see Leander Keck, A Future for the Histor­
ical Jesus (Nashville and New York, 1971), chapter two, especially 
pp. 50-56. My indebtedness to Keck is too far-reaching to indicate 
adequately with footnotes; I worked one year as his graduate assistant 
at Vanderbilt University.
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Thomas J, Kerr, IV
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, HUMANITIES AND HISTORY: 
THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER
We live in an age of crisis and change. We are all part of the 
problem. We are all part of the solution. We cannot abstract 
either problems or solutions from our involvement. We can in­
crease our understanding of problems and possible solutions. We 
can heighten our perception of self and society to give more 
purposeful direction to our personal and collective life.
The imbalance and disarray of our society envelopes us. We 
have great technological capacity to alter our physical environ­
ment. We can produce the most complex computers, send men to 
the moon and alter the face of our planet. We witness medical 
miracles and revolutions in agriculture. Advances in communica­
tions and transportation have produced one world. Jet propulsion 
and atomic energy have created power sources beyond the 
expectations of earlier generations.
Yet, many of our greatest technological achievements are 
hollow. While we have solved numerous technical problems we 
have unwittingly created others. The ecology and energy crises 
are only the most dramatic recent examples. Nuclear wars and 
urban blight are others. While we have created one world physi­
cally, in human relationships both our own and world society 
reflect discord and disunity.
We h ave made gods of science, technology and the organiza­
tional forms which serve their needs. Shaped in this image, our 
institutions have not kept pace with the problems. In many cases 
they have increased the problems of disorientation and disloca­
tion. They fail to adapt to change. They fail to meet human 
needs. They confuse priorities and consequently, in the name of 
good, wreak human and institutional destruction. Watergate, that 
spreading stain on our national life and government, is but a 
logical consequence.
In our nation we face a crisis of confidence and skepticism on 
a part of the majority of the people, which if ignored, could 
destroy most of our institutions. In a recent Lou Harris poll of 
American attitudes, 71 per cent of those surveyed felt that the
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Federal government failed to improve their lives. In a dramatic 
increase from a similar poll seven years earlier, 61 per cent 
beli eved that what they thought did not count. Fifty-three per 
cent felt that something was deeply wrong in America and a 
surprising 45 per cent felt that the quality of life had grown 
worse over the past ten years. ^
There are other signs of disillusionment. The “occult wave” 
evidenced in the rising popularity of The Exorcist^ witchcraft, 
voodoo, horoscopes, fortune telling, palmistry and spiritualism 
reflects a rejection of societal goals and institutions for the 
hidden, secretive and supernatural. Psychotherapist Dr. Rollo 
May sees the occult wave as “a reaction against a science and 
objectivity that many people feel just didn’t work.”^
We cannot blame science, technology and modern organiza­
tional form for our problems. Certainly a strong case exists for 
their achievements. They are, in themselves, neither good nor 
bad. Rather we need to consider why their application has 
separated man from man, and man from his institutions and 
community. Our approach to knowledge in the academic and the 
closely allied professional world offers valuable insight into this 
problem.
At root our problem is one of perception. Practitioners in the 
social sciences, humanities and history all have different per­
ceptions of our world and our problems. Certainly these percep­
tions have done much to contribute to our understanding and 
enrichment. We know that how we perceive relationships deter­
mines how we perceive life. At the turn of the century a series 
of experiments in psychology demonstrated the importance of 
perception. A subject was given goggles with inverted lenses. 
The result was extreme disorientation. As the individual learned 
to deal with the world through the goggles, his entire vision field 
inverted. A revolutionary transformation of vision occurred which 
permitted the viewer to see the world as he had before. What a 
man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what 
his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to 
see.”^ The context of the viewing and the eye of the beholder 
determine perception.
In the twentieth century the social sciences have added new 
dimensions to the perception of man in society. The social 
sciences developed rapidly in the late nineteenth century and
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reached new heights in our own times. In the United States during 
the 1960’s they grew by 163 per cent, more than any occupational 
group. Our greater affluence and the increase of social problems 
in a rapidly changing, technologically based society account for 
much of the growth."^
In general the social sciences are “those mental or cultural 
sciences which deal with the activities of the individual as a 
member of a group.Among the most commonly listed disci­
plines are economics, sociology, anthropology, political science, 
and social psychology. Practitioners of these disciplines share 
the desire to apply rigorous scientific methodology to man in a 
social setting. The goal is to analyze problems, identify uni­
formities (or deviations from norms), state general laws of 
behavior, and predict future behavior. Methodology is all impor­
tant in determining the results. Social scientists employ descrip­
tive analysis of historical experience, mathematical techniques, 
theoretical models for analysis and prediction, and comparative 
analysis.^ Perception depends on the conceptual framework 
employed for analysis and the particular data observed. As 
sociologist Daniel Bell has stated, “Reality is a flux of events. 
What every observer does is to select salient aspects for compar­
ison . . .;this saliency is determined by a conceptual scheme.”^
The perceptions of the social scientist have given us valuable 
tools for analyzing our society, identifying problems, stating 
alternative solutions, planning, and, within a limited range, 
predictingo They have given us considerable insight into rational 
and irrational behavior. Numerous theories have had significant 
impact. Those of John Maynard Keynes in economics have altered 
our emphasis from saving to consumption. Christopher Jencks and 
his associates have attacked the conventional wisdom that 
claims democratic schooling brings greater economic equality. 
Behaviorists, such as B. F. Skinner, have built a theory of 
culture, freedom and dignity around the conditioned reflex.® The 
social science model operates by control and exclusion. Vari­
ables are selected, defined and controlled in the interest of 
identifying uniformities and predictability.
Despite the perceptual contributions of the social sciences, 
they have serious limitations. While in science paradigms are 
usually widely accepted for extensive time periods, the social 
sciences are constantly shifting according to the current social 
problems. In science agreement usually prevails on what should 
be taught. In the social sciences, the absence of agreement
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creates insecurity. This often leads to an over emphasis on 
methodology. The result is fragmentation. Too frequently social 
scientists select studies based on their adaptability to accepted 
methodologies rather than significance. This breaks communica­
tions with all but the most highly specialized.
There are other limitations. Recall the failures of long term 
predictability: the elimination of poverty in the 1920’s; economic 
stagnation and population decline of the 1930’s, and the expand­
ing population forecasts of the 1950’s. The attempt to frame 
universal social laws is also a record of more frustrations than 
successes.^ As Alfred North Whitehead pointed out, political 
economy after Adam Smith dispelled many economic fallacies and 
taught us how to think about the industrial revolution, but it also 
formulated a disastrous set of abstractions that “de-humanized 
industry.
The humanities, including fine arts, music and literature, offer 
different perceptions of reality even though they share some 
common characteristics with the social sciences. In the 
humanities the academic disciplines exhibit some perceptual 
limitations similar to those in the social sciences. The separa­
tion of idea and action through abstraction and fragmentation are 
common. In some areas methodology even comes to supersede the 
significance of content.^^
The humanities, like the social sciences, have practitioners 
and significance outside academe. The artist, musician and 
writer offer substantially different perception from social scien­
tists. The humanities arise “out of man’s need to create for 
himself ... a meaningful and valuable world: ... to intensify, 
and to project in more permanent forms those precious parts of his 
experience that would otherwise slip too quickly out of his 
grasp.” The humanities are personal attempts “to widen the 
province of the personality, so that feelings, emotions, attitudes, 
and values . . . can be transmitted with all their force and mean­
ing to other persons or to other cultures.”*^
The humanities are individual efforts to grasp reality as a 
whole. Visual art plays an important role in this process. The 
first symbolic abstraction is usually an image. This is then 
followed by an idea which enters human consciousness. The 
gothic cathedral with the conception of space embodied in the 
vault is intimately related to the idea of a transcendental and
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infinite deity. Sir Herbert Read argues that “it is only in so far 
as the artist establishes symbols for the representation of reality 
that mind, as a structure of thought can take shape.” The artist 
perceives reality and represents “his consciousness of these 
new aspects of reality in plastic or poetic images.
Many artists have discussed their efforts to direct perception 
of reality into images and human consciousness. The personal 
experience of the artist is intimately involved with his percep­
tion. ITie Russian, Vassili Kandinsky, one of the founders of 
abstract painting, described his perceptual process as “suffering, 
searching, tormented souls deeply sundered by the conflict 
between spirit and matter.” Jackson Pollock saw his innovative 
methods as part of his desire “to express my feelings rather than 
illustrate them.” Pablo Picasso viewed his painting as an “art 
experience” that expressed a clear emotion. He wanted only one 
interpretation and “in that one to some extent the possibility of 
recognizing nature, even distorted nature which is, after all, a 
kind of struggle between my interior life and the external world 
as it exists for most people.
Lewis Mumford summarized this process when he noted that 
the artist attempts to communicate his perception “through a 
common language of symbols and forms” which embodies “the 
experience of a lifetime: the potentialities of many lifetimes. 
These esthetic moments endow life with a new meaning; and these 
new meanings heighten life with other esthetic moments.
Music is a similar expression of perception in different form. 
Composers are creative artists who develop feelings, emotions 
and ideas from their contacts with the world. Cultural and per­
sonal factors enter the process. Igor Stravinsky has noted the 
importance of perceptual observation. “The faculty of creating is 
never given to us all by itself. It always goes hand in hand with 
the gift of observation. And the true creator may be recognized 
by his ability always to find about him, in the commonest and 
humblest thing, items worthy of note.”^^
In describing the whole process of music as an expression of 
perception and unity, American composer-musician Aaron Cope­
land argued that:
A composer writes music to express and communicate and 
put down in permanent form certain thoughts, emotions and 
states of being. These thoughts and emotions are gradually
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formed by the contact of the composer’s personality with 
the world in which he lives. He expresses these ... in the 
musical language of his own time.^^
The combination of individual perception based on experience 
and the search for broader unity finds expression in literature as 
well as art and music. Often the creative force comes from a 
conflict between the writer and his society. It comes from the 
struggle to give life meaning.^^ While the writer may write for 
himself, social significance “obtrudes through the cracks,” in the 
words of novelist Graham Greene, ‘Tike grass through cement.” 
Ultimately, “by means of its writers a society communicates 
with itself.”^^ The writer enchances knowledge and serves as 
“a conferer of shape, an interpreter of direction” in a world 
where “shapelessness, lack of meaning, and being without 
direction is most people’s nightmare . . ..” ^
The complex novels of James Joyce illustrate the interrela­
tionship between the individual and broad themes of human 
existence. Joyce employed elaborate techniques of internal 
self-examination, historical myths and dreams. Thornton Wilder 
claimed that Joyce “was hunting for a style that would reveal 
the extent to which every individual — you and I, the millions of 
the people who walk this earth — is both sole and unique and 
also archetypical.”^^
Compared to the social sciences, the humanities offer a 
different, complementary perceptual insight into man and society. 
They are both more individualistic and more grandiose in con­
ception. They are less methodological and vastly more intuitive. 
In the academic world the humanities reflect an organizational 
fragmentation similar to the social sciences. An even more 
fundamental fragmentation results from the multitude of indivi­
dualized conceptions of practitioners. The problems of man and 
society are spoken to sometimes with deep insight, sometimes 
with little, but always with many voices.
History has some assets of both the social sciences and 
humanities, but it also has limitations. Academicians and his­
torians themselves have long debated whether history is a social 
science or humanity. Some colleges and universities house it in 
the academic structure with one, some with the other.Simply 
defined, “history as a study is the attempt to discover and 
understand what happened.^^ This attempt to discover and 
understand is richly enhanced by a tradition in both the social
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sciences and humanities. John B. Bury, 19th century historian of 
the late Roman period, claimed that true history could be 
attained only through the discovery, collection, classification, 
and interpretation of facts through scientific research.” His 
emphasis was on methodology and accumulation. Thomas 
Babington Macaulay, a 19th century English historian in the best 
literary tradition, represented quite a different philosophy. He 
insisted that history begins in novel and ends in essay and 
that the historian is most like the portrait painter whose works 
are resemblances — but not mere resemblances, faithful — but 
more than faithful . . . ”27
In recent decades social science insight and methodology have 
profoundly influenced historians and historical perception. In 
studying an event *The use of social science approaches focuses 
attention on the aspects of the event that reveal the major 
dynamics of the culture, the uniformities rather those
features that appear to be most colorful or unique.” Illustra­
tions abound. Psychology has helped historians analyze person­
ality, motivation, the irrational and emotional in history. Histor­
ians have employed the models of the economist, the comparative 
techniques of the anthropologist and the structural analysis of 
the sociologist. They have become actively involved with 
computer methodology and Quantitative approaches initially 
applied in the social sciences.^^
Historians do not always eagerly embrace the social sciences. 
Substantial differences between history and the social sciences 
exist. Social scientists usually form hypotheses first and then go 
to the data, while historians more frequently follow a deductive 
path based on an examination of the data first. The social 
scientist attempts to increase perception through applying pre­
cise structures of thought and methodology while historians, 
more like the humanities, often proceed through suggestion and 
indirection. While the historian implies the direction of events, 
he does not seek predictability. Historians are often unwilling to 
exchange “the free creativity of the artist for the more restricted 
methods of science.
While historians, like social scientists, might wish to assume 
that methodology and precision discount personal involvement and 
bias, they have much greater difficulty in sustaining such a view. 
Like the writer, artist and musician, the historian cannot sepa­
rate mind “from feelings, needs and fantasies.” He “is ines-
22
capably part of the evidence he attempts to assess.”^^ Increas­
ingly historians recognize this intimacy with the present and 
argue that a dispassionate view of the past is not possible. The 
methods and insight of the historian are as valid, in some ways 
even more valid, in analyzing contemporary events.
History differs from both the humanities and social sciences 
in attempting to perceive a total picture. Those in the humanities, 
while seeking universals, do so through a highly individualized 
and unique perception. The social scientist attempts to abstract 
the particular from reality. The historian, ‘‘while investigating 
the particular never loses sight of the complete whole, on which 
it is working.’’^^
The social sciences, humanities, and history have important 
differences, but they all strive to enlarge human perception. 
Discipline, creativity and a relationship to the times provide 
elements of commonality to all. The careful application of 
methodology and discipline in research and thought are well 
known marks of academic scholars in the social sciences, 
humanities and history. For the artist, musician or writer the 
rigors of discipline are equally important to achievement and 
creativity. The discipline is self-imposed, personal and intense, 
often requiring the individual to divorce himself from his personal 
life during creative periods.The failure to achieve discipline, 
regardless of talent and perception, ultimately leads only to 
disintegration.^^
The social scientist, the practitioner of the humanities, and 
the historian all strive to express creativity. In essence creativ­
ity is a new perception — one which communicates a broader, a 
more beautiful insight into the reality of life. For the social 
scientist it may be a new model, for the writer a new society or a 
personal idiosyncrasy, for the historian a new interpretation, for 
the musician a new tone pattern, and for the artist a new balance 
of light and color.^^
Social scientists, those in the humanities, and historians, all 
recognized the impact of their own times in affecting methodology, 
style and content of their work. The times do influence percep­
tion. In the past decade “new left” scholars, in most academic 
fields, have reasserted the significance of contemporary prob­
lems.Even those who reject their times feel the impact. 
“Whatever the source of the emotion that drives me to create,”
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stated Pablo Picasso, “I want to give it a form that has some 
connection with the visible world, even if it is only to wage war 
on that world.
The central problem of our time is one of perception. We live 
in an era dominated by specialists, those whom Lewis Mumford 
calls “unbalanced men who have made a madness out of their 
method.We are divided from ourselves and from a broader 
meaning of life. We have lost confidence in ourselves and our 
society. We have lost a sense of life as an organic whole and 
come to view it as mechanistic parts.Our perception of life — 
self and social — has mirrored the fragmentation of our man-made 
world reinforcing fragmentation rather than correcting it.
In our post industrial society we have a knowledge-technology 
with capacity far in excess of any previous era. This has come at 
a high cost. Sociologist Daniel Bell has pointed out that the 
knowledge explosion in most disciplines has geometrically 
increased the problem of selection and generalization. Greater 
human interaction through communications and transportation has 
increased problems of coordination. This in turn has necessitated 
costly organization and planning.Too often, while we may 
have improved perception of the particular, we have obscured the 
general.
In our post Watergate society we experience the disastrous 
impact of this perceptual failure. The time honored professions 
of politics and law suffer disrepute because able practitioners 
have applied their talents and conceived their loyalties and 
responsibilities too narrowly.Too frequently those in the 
social sciences, humanities and history share this spirit of 
narrowness. Increasingly there is a feeling in the academic world 
that “the obsession with rationalism, embodied in the worship of 
scientific objectivity, has seriously damaged personal as well as 
scholarly perceptions.”'^^
Nearly half a century ago, Alfred North Whitehead identified 
the danger of “thought within a groove.” “Each profession 
makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove . . . But 
there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the 
comprehension of human life.” In such a situation “the leading 
intellectuals lack balance” and while “the specialized functions 
of the community are performed better and more progressively, 
the generalized direction lacks vision.
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What can we do to replace thought in a grove with a broader 
comprehension of life that embodies perception with unity, 
balance and vision? We must seek a greater understanding of 
truth in relation to perception. We must also seek instruction from 
models of greater perceptual unity and balance. We must devise 
specific strategies.
Truth is the perception of meaning in contexts. In this sense 
truth is in the eye of the beholder. If the context for perception 
is narrowly defined the insight perceived may meet the test of 
truth in that context but have little other meaning and thus little 
truth, in a wider context. The search for truth is the search for 
the most meaningful perception in the broadest possible context. 
A simple analogy demonstrates the point. ‘‘When you understand 
all about the sun and all about the atmosphere and all about the 
rotation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance of the 
sunset.
In addition to an understanding of perception, essential 
ingredients in the search for truth are the freedom of pursuit, 
commitment and tolerance. Without the freedom of pursuit, con­
texts and perception become limited. No commitment, and dogmatic 
commitment are equally destructive. Both skepticism as a 
fanaticism of doubt and absolute beliefs in absolute truths 
are intolerant and thus destructive of truth. The French philo­
sopher, Jacques Maritain, defined the problem precisely:
There is real and genuine tolerance only when a man is 
firmly and absolutely convinced of a truth, or what he holds 
to be a truth, and when he at the same time recognizes the 
right of those who deny this truth to exist, and their right 
to contradict him and speak their own mind, not because 
they are free from truth but because they seek truth in their 
own way, and he respects in them human nature and human 
dignity and those very resources and living springs of the 
intellect and of the conscience which make them potentially 
capable of attaining the truth he loves, if some day they 
happen to see it.46
Many models furnish insight into truth conceived with maximum 
meaning in the broadest context. The lives of some historical 
figures such as Albert Schweitzer, Thomas Jefferson, and Leo­
nardo da Vinci bear witness to a balanced and unified approach, 
to life. Such men avoided concentrating their efforts in one field 
and searched for broader wholistic perceptions of life.
Perhaps no society has achieved as unified a perception of
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life as the ancient Greeks. They achieved a true organic view. 
They always sought the most pervasive law which would harmon­
ize life and give meaning to all its dimensions. Every part was 
subordinate to an ideal whole. They sought to educate man to 
his true form, the real and genuine human nature. From the 
Greeks we gain our concept and model of humanism, the human­
ities and the liberal arts.^^
Other models also offer insight into a unified life perception. 
The great world religions embody such insight. For Christians 
the Great Commandments, “You shall love the Lord your God 
with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with^all your mind 
. . . You shall love your neighbor as yourself, relate self,
others, and God in unity.
We must eradicate the fragmentation and resulting skepticism 
of our time. We need strategies to enhance the broadest possible 
perception of both contexts and meanings. We need to seek the 
most general truth. To this end we need new organizational 
patterns and new approaches to relate ideas to experience and to 
each other.
In higher education we must restore the liberal arts college to 
the center of the educational process and devise improved 
patterns for interaction between those in the liberal arts and 
those in professional studies. In the liberal arts we must over­
come the fragmentation between and within disciplines. \^e 
must transcend departmentalism with more unified organizational 
patterns. The teacher-scholar must participate in more than one 
discipline or one specialty within a discipline. We need more 
programs involving students in experience related to ideas and 
involving experienced practitioners with those working with ideas.
We must overcome fragmentation in teaching. Teachers must 
become connectors of ideas and relators of ideas to experience. 
John Ciardi has put it incisively:
The right teaching question is not, “How do you feel about 
this idea” but “If this is the idea, what can we use to 
describe it, define it (if possible), and to evaluate it, not 
for ourselves alone but as a way of locating agreements and 
disagreements with the thinking of others who have explored 
the same idea.^^
Increased use of the comparative technique would help implement 
this strategy. Teaching offers infinite opportunities for comparing
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theory and practice, the ideas of one discipline to those in 
another, and differing interpretations in the same discipline.*'^^ 
All disciplines offer valuable perceptions. Their value increases 
as those perceptions meet the test of meaning in different con­
texts.
Such strategies are essential. Only as we implement them will 
we end destructive fragmentation. Only then will we find it 
possible to perceive truth in a way which helps us approach life 
as a living whole.
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CELEBRATION
Heaven is only the bluest 
Victories have a dimension 
Longer than sea drift or tideline 
Wider than day silent shifting
Walls had kept angling inward 
Echo was backward reminding 
Heavy the deadening summer 
Shattering shell into silence
Tentative time in the seeding 
Wind tossed to future for flower 
Voi ce to a seasoned salvation 
Bright for an infinite blooming
Shouting of blue in the blooming 
Angling of chicory shining 
Victory fills on the roadside 
The multiple cups of reflection
Heaven is only the bluest 
Victories have a dimension 
Stronger than walls or than silence 
The force in the wind and the singing.
— Sylvia Vance
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SUPERCARGO IN RALPH ELUSOKS INVISIBLE MAN
In chapter three of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, the un­
named narrator recalls an anxiety-ridden visit made as a college 
student to the Golden Day, a local black “sporting and gambling 
house.” Though the narrator merely wants a glass of whiskey for 
the shocked and fainting white trustee, Mr. Norton, the two of 
them are forced by circumstances to enter the Golden Day and 
remain there for some time. By chance, the Golden Day is filled 
with the shell-shocked veterans from the nearby asylum and their 
attendant. Supercargo, on their weekly ‘therapy’ visit. In view of 
the importance of naming in the novel,^ the unusual name Ellison 
gives to the hospital attendant in charge of the vets seems 
deliberately selected as a sign of the thematic implications of 
the Golden Day scene.
The naming of Supercargo is used by Ellison to point both to 
the external social controls that structure American society and 
to the internal controls of the Invisible Man’s own developing 
consciousness. The name. Supercargo, has an immediate denota­
tive meaning that Ellison would be aware of from his service in 
the Merchant Marine. According to the OED, the present defini­
tion of a supercargo is: “an officer on board a merchant ship 
whose business it is to superintend the cargo and the commercial 
transactions of the voyage.” And, in now obsolete usage, the 
word refers to “an agent who superintended a merchant’s busi­
ness in a foreign country.” Certainly in a very general sense, 
Ellison’s Supercargo is handling cargo: black men whose ances­
tors were the slave cargo of many a commercial voyage. And, in 
keeping these men in line, he is an agent of the white society 
whose interests he represents. In its denotative meaning, ‘super­
cargo’ leads into the book’s portrait of the relationship between 
white and black society.
Yet the commercial and nautical metaphors inherent in the 
name for the hospital attendant remain largely inert in the Golden 
Day scene itself. The events recounted there suggest instead 
that Ellison chose the name for its potential echoes: that is, he 
chose supercargo because it echoes superego. Fhe two words 
differ in only one syllable, and the attendant clearly functions in 
the scene as the externalized superego for the veterans, who, for
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reasons not wholly bad, do not regulate their thoughts or behavior 
by means of any internalized censor.^ Ellison draws our attention 
to this function for his character through more than the choice of 
name: the comments of the vets, the conflicts in the scene, and 
the relation of the Golden Day episode to the novel’s major 
thematic concerns all reinforce the verbal echoes between Super­
cargo and superego. This punning allusiveness in the name per­
mits Ellison to create awareness of both the social forces that 
are internalized by the superego and the inner world of the 
narrator s consciousness. Through Supercargo as superego, 
Ellison externalizes the pattern that Freud sees operative within 
the individual personality, implies that it also operates as a 
social mechanism, and then returns us to the personal develop­
ment of the Invisible Man, who, “on the lower frequencies,” may 
speak for us.
In the Golden Day, one of the vets, described as “short, fat, 
and very intelligent-looking,” refers to the attendant. Supercargo, 
as a “kind of censor,” who is sent along with the vets “to see 
that the therapy fails.The suggestion that Supercargo should 
make us think of superego is also given credence by the language 
of the narrator s anxiety when he enters the Golden Day: “Super­
cargo, the white-uniformed attendant who usually kept the men 
quiet was nowhere to be seen. I didn’t like it for when he was 
upstairs they had absolutely no inhibitions”(59). Supercargo is 
there to censor behavior; he is there to repress, to inhibit the 
expression of feelings or desires. This corresponds to the 
function of the superego as Freud defined it: “In the course of 
an individual s development a portion of the inhibiting forces in 
the external world are internalized and an agency is constructed 
in the ego which confronts the rest of the ego in an observing, 
criticizing and prohibiting sense. We call this new agency the 
superego. However, the veterans have not internalized the 
superego fully; it remains an external and visible censor, openly 
at odds with the ego and the id, and Ellison has made the state 
of tension between controller and controlled the dramatic focus of 
the chapter.
The comments of the vets further develop the superego- 
Supercargo identification. The source of the superego generally 
lies in the internalization of the supervisory role which the
parents - specifically, for Freud, the father - played in the
child s life: The superego arises, as we know, from an identi­
fication with the father taken as model.Interestingly, the
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veterans in the Golden Day have fathers on their minds. When the 
vets bring Mr. Norton into the house, one is cursing his own 
father (60). When Supercargo himself is down and the men kick 
him, a vet says in justification: “I’m 45 and he’s been acting 
like he’s my old man”(64). Both Supercargo and the white-haired 
Mr. Norton are linked with father figures by the vets; one calls 
the white trustee his grandfather: “ ‘Gentlemen, this man is my 
grandfather!’ ‘But he’s white, his name’s Norton!’ should know 
my own grandfather’ ”(60).
And, obviously, the vet does know who his metaphorical 
grandfather is: both Mr. Norton, white trustee of an all black 
college, and Supercargo are father figures and representatives of 
the inhibiting and controlling force the white world exerts over 
the blacks. Though a black man himself. Supercargo is called 
“the white uniformed attendant,” and when he first appears to 
quiet the unruly vets, the narrator says, “I hardly recognized him 
without his hard-starched white uniform”(63). Given the symbolic 
use of white and black throughout Invisible Man, (most notable in 
the Liberty Paints episode), the white uniform for the black 
attendant certainly implies that his authority symbolically 
derives from the white world. Supercargo’s few words reveal his 
own sense of his role: “ ‘I want order down there,’ Supercargo 
boomed, ‘and if there’s white folks down there I wan s double 
order’ ”(63). But his power is broken, the white unilormed 
superego ineffective, perhaps because he has taken off his 
authoritative whiteness. The vets attack their censor, dragging 
him down the stairs and kicking him into unconsciousness. Mr. 
Norton protests, but the men are kicking Supercargo because 
he represents the white codes that Mr. Norton is speaking for. In 
response to Mr. Norton’s protest, they say of Supercargo, He s 
the white folks’ man!”(64), and they begin jumping on him with 
both feei. The white man himself is somehow in the melee hurt 
and shoved unconscious under the stairwell. No direct assault is 
openly made against him, but his fortunes are tied to those of 
Supercargo.
As an agent of the white world among black vets Supercargo 
serves as a symbol of the authority and repressive censorship of 
the superego within the mind. And the mind’s condition is a major 
issue in the scene. The vets are classified as insane. They say 
what they shouldn’t; their ideas are illogical, irrational, absurd. 
Yet nothing in the scene indicates that we should support Super­
cargo’s efforts at control. The release from his control is instead
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to be sought. That Supercargo in this context is meant to suggest 
not merely the external but also an internal repression and control 
IS most strikingly revealed by the vet named Sylvester. When 
*^he narrator to become involved in the overthrow of Super- 
cargo, he says: “ ‘Try it, school-boy, it feels so good. It gives 
you relief. . . . ‘Sometimes I get so afraid of him I feel that he’s 
inside my head. There!’ he said, giving Supercargo another 
kick (65). Later another vet links Mr. Norton too with the inner 
control of a man’s mind: told that Mr. Norton is a truste e, he 
replies, “ ‘One of the very first, no doubt. ... A trustee of 
consciousness’ ”(69).
As the scene at the Golden Day progresses, the narrator 
witnesses one of the vets, a former doctor, care for the injured 
Mr. Norton and act as if he were the white man’s equal. This 
behavior shocks the narrator more than the treatment given 
Supercargo, because the boy whose experience is narrated has 
accepted the white man’s evaluation of blacks: his white super­
ego IS in full control. He says in distress, “Men like us did not 
look at a man like Mr. Norton in that manner, and I stepped 
hurriedly forward”(69). The vet, he says, was “acting toward the 
white man with a freedom which could only bring on trouble”(71). 
The importance of the boy-narrator’s fear and awe of the white 
man is that he has developed, through his attitude toward whites, 
a superego that is destructive of his own potential and identity. 
The doctor tries to explain to the narrator that the white world 
inhibits, controls, and destroys the humanity of black men: 
apparently quite sane, clearly an expert in his field (his diagno­
sis of Mr. Norton’s special condition is recognized by the trustee 
as entirely correct), the doctor has been driven out of society 
(literally by the Ku Klux Klan) by the impossibility of living a 
life of human dignity as a black in the white world. But the 
Invisible Man does not at the time permit himself to understand 
the doctor’s words. As the vet says, “ ‘He registers with his 
senses but short circuits his brain’ ”(72); “ ‘Already he’s
learned to repress not only his emotions but his humanity’ ”(72). 
And what the black narrator has accepted as the controlling and 
censoring agency in his life is, as the doctor again says, “ ‘That 
great false wisdom taught slaves and pragmatists alike, that 
white is right’ ”(73).
In the Golden Day episode, then, a group of insane black 
veterans beat up their attendant. Yet it is the narrator’s superego, 
rather than their Supercargo, that is or should be challenged. His
W
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loss of humanity and loss of identity have resulted from the 
internalization of the roles and values required of him in the 
largely white world. In the Epilogue, the narrator will at last 
see: “My problem was that I always tried to go in everyone’s 
way but my own”(433). The Golden Day scene presents not 
merely riot and disorder, not merely the discharge of crazed 
hostility, but a necessary rejection of a superego that enforces 
white thinking on the black man and society’s thinking on the 
individual. The vets, jubilantly, though temporarily, free them­
selves from Supercargo, but the Invisible Man needs the shocks 
of Bledsoe’s letter, the job at Liberty Paints, and the Brother­
hood’s betrayal of Tod Clifton to free himself from the repressive, 
destructive control of his social censor, his white superego.
And yet Ellison’s book, even in the Golden Day scene, speaks 
for whites as well as blacks. In the first three major episodes of 
the novel (Battle Royal, Jim Trueblood’s dream. Golden Day), 
the dramatic confrontations involve the release of inhibitions and 
repressions, and in all three it is the abnormality and anxiety of 
white responses to natural desires, to the animal side of being 
human, that are most noticeable and disturbing. Mr. Norton, for 
example, has been made physically ill by the intensity of his 
interest in Jim Trueblood’s story of incest, while Trueblood 
himself has accepted and dealt with his behavior in a healthy and 
responsible manner. The whites are the source of the superego 
that confines the Invisible Man in these early chapters, but they 
are not themselves freed from its repressions and prohibitions. 
In each scene, the black world is needed to act out for the white 
one a release from the censorious control that denies acceptance 
of the full range of humanity to the whites as well as to the 
bl acks. In his essay, “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black 
Mask of Humanity,” Ellison has commented more generally upon 
this role for blacks: “The Negro stereotype is really an image of 
the unorganized, irrational forces of American life, forces through 
which, by projecting them in forms of images of an easily domi­
nated minority, the white individual seeks to be at home in the 
vast unknown world of America.”^ As well, we might add, as in 
the vast unknown world of himself.
In these early sections of Invisible Man, both Mr. Norton and 
the narrator are abstractions — god and slave, power and machine 
~ rather than human beings. They have lost humanity by accept­
ing the destructive conventional censor. Speaking of Buck Finn’s 
decision to free Jim and “go to hell,” Ellison has addressed in
another context the need to reject the social censor of the super­
ego and restore the self to knowledge of the flux and fullness of 
complex human possibility: “And it will be noted that when Huck 
makes his decision he identifies himself with Jim and accepts 
the judgment of his superego - that internalized representative of 
the community — that his action is evil. Like Prometheus, who 
for mankind stole fire from the gods, he embraces the evil implicit 
in his act in order to affirm his belief in humanity. Jim, therefore, 
is not simply a slave, he is a symbol of humanity, and in freeing 
Jim, Huck makes a bid to free himself from the conventionalized 
evil taken for civilization by the town.”^ So in the Golden Day 
scene, the author asks us to embrace the violence and disorder, 
the passion and desires that are unleashed by the vets as part 
of our humanity: in so doing, we free ourselves, and the ‘therapy’ 
available at the Golden Day will not be ‘thwarted’ by Supercargo.
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THE IMPERTINENT
A wild and white plum tree,
Later to be green,
Arrested me that day.
Under the fickle spring sun
, V' ^
I watched the petals snow.
Tender fruitlets.
Should they escape the pinch.
Might later grace the thorny lines
With puckery yield —
r . Scant pay for a season’s patience.
Or so it seemed to me
As I, under the cloud.
; - 3 - Forecast meagerness ahead.
In summer’s fullness
I stopped again.
The pebbly fruits.
Those tiny plums.
■. Had defied each adversity
Of frost and wind and rain.
m-:
m.
To what end, I fretted,
Should nature clasp these pips. 
Sourish stones.
And drop so many sweets?
No oracle, surly or polite.
Nodded at my impertinence.
James R, Bailey
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Norman Chaney
THEODORE ROETHKE: DIONYSIAN POET OF NATURE
The Roman Catholic theologian and literary critic, Father 
Willaim Lynch, has noted that there are two extremes of literary 
imagination in our time, one which exploits the “real’’ in order to 
produce a mystical vision of the transcendent,^ and another 
which faces the facts of the real in order to produce a vision of 
the world as ‘ ‘a kind of Hell revisited.”2 The exploiters of the 
real are those writers of angelic imagination, whose chief 
ambition is to see visions and to dream dreams, to live, as it 
were, in an unworldly paradise. The facers of the facts, on the 
other hand, are those writers of mundane imagination, whose chief 
ambition is to describe the world in all its ugliness and contin­
gency, to usher before the mind of the reader an image of life as 
depraved and hopeless.
I wish to suggest, however, that there is still a third type of 
literary imagination in our time, and that this type of imagination 
is exemplified in the work of the modern American poet, Theodore 
Roethke. Roethke, I shall be suggesting, was neither an exploiter 
of the real nor a facer of fact. Rather, he was a poet who per­
ceived that the world, in spite of its ugliness and contingency, 
was also a place of beauty, mystery, and worth; and that the man 
who could learn to contemplate this beauty, mystery, and worth 
would find himself in the final analysis a happy man.
Roethke was born in 1908 in Saginaw, Michigan. The poet was 
of German heritage, his paternal grandfather having immigrated to 
America in 1870 from East Prussia, where he had been Bis­
marck’s head forester. In Saginaw the grandfather started a 
Horticulture establishment, a business which he handed down to 
his two sons, Charles and Otto (the latter being the poet’s 
father). When the business was at its height, around 1920, “it 
took up twenty-five acres within the city of Saginaw with a 
quarter of a million feet under glass.Roethke remembered 
fondly throughout his life his childhood experiences in and around 
the greenhouses, turning again and again to these experiences as 
subject and inspiration for his poetry. Indeed, in one of his last 
published poems he writes:
In my mind’s eye I see those fields of glass,
As 1 looked out at them from the hi^ house,
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Riding beneath the moon, hid from the moon,
Then slowly breaking whiter in the dawn;
When George the watchman’s lantern dropped from sight 
The long pipes knocked: it was the end of night.
I’d stand upon my bed, a sleepless child 
Watching the waking of my father’s world. - 
0 world so far away! 0 my lost world!^
In 1922, Charles and Otto Roethke had a dispute which re­
sulted in their selling of the family-owned business. Shortly 
thereafter Charles committed suicide, and Otto fell ill, dying in 
1923. Two years later, Roethke entered the University of Michi­
gan, beginning an academic career that eventually took him to 
Harvard (as a graduate student) and to a number of other colleges 
and universities (Lafayette, Penn State, Bennington, the Univer­
sity of Washington) as a professor of literature. In the course of 
his career as a poet, Roethke published nine volumes, and won 
all the major awards that are offered in the field of poetry on the 
American scene (including the Pulitzer Prize, in 1954). At his 
death in 1963, he left over one-hundred fifty notebooks filled with 
poems in progress. Many of these notebooks have now been 
edited and published by David Wagoner, himself a poet, who was 
for a number of years Roethke’s colleague at the University of 
Washington.
Roethke s biography affords a harvest for seekers of literary 
gossip. He was a brilliant man who was also at times something 
of a ring-tailed roarer. Recounting the unpredictability of 
Roethke’s moods, Mark Van Doren spoke of having received an 
invitation to a party which Roethke was giving in a hotel suite in 
New York City. Upon arriving at the party. Van Doren was sur­
prised to see the rooms decorated with dozens of roses, many of 
them still in their boxes, with Roethke himself dressed in his 
underwear and an old bathrobe. The climax came when Roethke 
dashed to a window, threw it open, and threatened to push his 
guests out it one by one. In the next few minutes there was a 
quiet but steady exodus as Roethke’s guests eased along the 
wall and out the door.
But there are also many stories of Roethke’s kindness and 
generosity, his gusto for life and his capacity for hard work. 
Unfortunately, he spent a number of his days in mental hospitals, 
suffering from what his doctors diagnosed as manic-depression. 
In spite of the debilitation and humiliation of these episodes, 
however, he seems to have written poetry every day of his adult 
life. It gave a fillip to his pride, says Roethke’s biographer.
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Allan Seager, to identify with other “mad” poets of the English 
language, such as Christopher Smart, John Clare, and William 
Blake, who in spite of their handicaps created works of great 
permanence.^
In attempting to define what comprises the permanence of 
Roethke’s work, we may begin by citing a passage from a late 
poem titled “The Far Field”:
I dream of journeys repeatedly;
Of flying like a bat deep into a narrowing tunnel,
Of driving alone, without luggage, out a long peninsula.
The road lined with a snow-laden second growth,
A fine dry snow ticking the windshield.
Alternate snow and sleet, no on-coming traffic.
And no lights behind, in the blurred side-mirror.
The road changing from glazed tarface to a rubble of stone.
Ending at last in a hopeless sand-rut.
Where the car stalls.
Churning in a snowdrift 
Until the headli^ts darken.^
Throughout his career Roethke was haunted by thoughts of death.
I dream of journeys repeatedly,” the poet proclaims. But these 
are often journeys to places where tunnels are narrowing, where 
roads are ending in a moment of cold and final darkness. In 
speaking of his own fears of death, however, the poet attained 
that universality which is the hallmark of great art. He seems to 
have captured a mood that has beset many modern men. It is a 
mood that is closely bound to a certain religious despair, the 
despair of not having anything ultimate to believe in anymore. In 
an attempt to describe the cultural context out of which this 
despair rises, the theologian Gordon D. Kaufman has written:
Our forefathers had a sense of God’s continuous providen­
tial guidance of history as a whole and of their individual 
destinies in particular; they found their lives meaningful 
because they were lived within the context of God’s pur­
poses, each man having his own unique place and task. But 
such meaning as most men of our time find is the this- 
worldly humanly created meaning emergent from ordinary 
social intercourse and/or cultural activity. For some this 
loss of a transcendent source and purpose has reduced 
human life to meaninglessness and absurdity, a pointless 
and empty burden simply to be endured (Beckett); others 
react with bitterness and revulsion (Sartre); still others seem 
to find sufficient satisfaction in their daily round of 
activities, punctuated occasionally by aesthetic experience 
or unusual excitement, not to miss or lament the dimensions
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of depth and transcendence and mystery in which previous 
generations found their lives ensconced. But in any case 
the radical “eclipse of God’’ (Buber) or even the final 
irretrievable “death of God’’ (Nietzsche) appears to be the 
most momentous theological fact of our age.*
On the basis of the darker moods of his poetry, some readers 
have been tempted to view Roethke as a prime spokesman for the 
theme of the eclipse of God.^ I submit, however, that it was these 
moods which prompted him to seek and express an alternative to 
this theme. In a speech which he presented at Northwestern 
University only a few months before his death, Roethke declared:
. . . there is a God, and He’s here, immediate, accessible.
He is accessible now, not only in works of art or in the 
glories of a particular religious service, or in the light, the 
aftermath that follows the dark ni^t of the soul, but in the 
lowest forms of life. He moves and has His being. Nobody 
has killed off the snails.^
The poet went on to observe that the idea that God is present 
and alive in all things is hardly a new thought. But he insisted 
that this idea is nevertheless one that “needs some practicing 
in Western thought.”The religious view that Roethke advo­
cated as an alternative to the theme of the eclipse of God is 
what may be described in traditional metaphysical terms as 
panentheism. In our immediate discussion, however, I shall 
characterize the religious view that emerges in Roethke’s work 
as a Dionysian view.
Dionysus was a strange and wild god of Greek mythology. He 
seems to have originated in Thrace, where he was a god of 
fertility and the power of nature. On Greek soil he became associ­
ated with metamorphosis, which is associated with the cycle of 
the seasons. The worship of Dionysus was literally enthusiastic; 
it involved ecstasy, license, revelry, and direct participation by 
eating in the life of the dying and reborn god. In the ecstasy 
induced by revelry and dancing the worshippers lost their own 
personalities and were merged with Dionysus. Thus the bound­
aries separating man, nature, and the divine were abolished.
The counterpart of Dionysus was Apollo. He was the god 
who most fully incarnates the ideals we associate with classical 
Greek thought: the god of the ego, of light, youth, purity, reason­
ableness, order, discipline and balance. Wisdom in the Apol-
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Ionian tradition consisted of learning the rues an oun aries
and in distinguishing with clarity between that w ic e ongs o
mortality and that which is immortal, between t e nowa ® ^ 
the unknowable, the possible and the impossi e, man an o 
The happy man, having learned the proper limits of humanity, 
followed the way of moderation and sought to govern e re e 
lious forces of the senses and the wayward imagina ion y t e 
imposition of discipline.
Now, Roethke, as a modern follower of the lonysian way, is 
concerned to break down the boundaries that separate t e ego, or 
the personality, from all the subhuman things an creatures o 
the earth. We may briefly contrast him in this concern wit a poet 
such as Robert Frost, who, as a poet of nature, requires to e 
conceived as primarily a follower of the Apollonian way. In a 
poem such as Frost’s “Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Lvening, 
for example, the speaker stands on the verge of the woo s oo 
ing in. I do not adhere to the interpretation of this poem (often 
associated with Lionel Trilling) which asserts that the speaker 
is contemplating suicide. I suggest, rather, that he is contem­
plating the abandonment of the civilized for the primitive, of 
security for risk, of order for chaos, of reason for ecstasy, of 
responsibility for no responsibility. Even though the speaker 
recognizes that the woods, as a symbol for the Dionysian way, 
“are lovely, dark and deep,” he is restrained by his sense of 
obligation within the human or social world from pursuing the 
beckoning mystery of the woods:
The woods are lovely, dark and deep, 
But 1 have promises to keep.
And miles to go before I sleep.
And miles to go before I sleep.
As a poet of the Apollonian way. Frost grasps the ideal of reason­
ableness and by force of will imposes it upon the primitive 
impulse to lose one’s personality, to surrender oneself to an 
immanental life-force that is everywhere and always present and 
active within the creation.
Roethke, on the other hand, as a follower of the Dionysian 
way, will not be content until he enters the world of nature. He 
wishes to immerse himself as fully as possible in the creation, 
to seek an imaginative identification of the “I” with the “not-I.” 
Both technically and emotionally this is a high-risk venture, and 
I propose to mention briefly the technical and emotional character
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of this risk.
Technically, the poetic brooding on forms of life remote from 
our own, such as Roethke practices, has traditionally been 
directed by a presiding appetite for analogy. The literary critic, 
John Wain, aptly describes this technical matter as it relates to 
Roethke:
“Even as” the flower or bird does such-and-such, the poet 
himself does so-and-so. The nightingale comforts the ailing 
Keats because it is a type of the immortality of art; indivi­
dual nightingales die, but since they all repeat the same 
song through century after century, they belong to a world of 
art that is immune to decay and death.
But Roethke’s meditations. Wain elaborates, are not analogical.
The participation they celebrate purports to be entirely immediate. 
This technique of composition presents special problems to the 
reader, for we are caught up in the poet’s immediate ruminations 
as he shuttles back and forth in time from the present moment 
even to the creation’s beginnings. A prime example of this method 
of composition occurs in a final passage from a poem titled 
“Praise to the End!”:
Arch of air, my heart’s original knock.
I’m awake all over:
I’ve crawled from the mire, alert as a saint or a dog;
I know the back-stream’s joy, and the stone’s eternal pulseless longing.
Felicity I cannot hoard.
My friend, the rat in the wall, brings me the clearest messages;
I bask in the bower of change;
The plants wave me in, and the summer apples;
My palm-sweat flashes gold;
Many astounds before, I lost my identity to a pebble;
The minnows love me, and the humped and spitting creatures.
I believe! I believe! —
In the sparrow, happy on gravel;
In the winter-wasp, pulsing its wings in the sunlight;
I have been somewhere else; I remember the sea-faced uncles. 
I hear, clearly, the heart of another singing.
Lighter than bells.
Softer than water.
Wherefore, 0 birds and small fish, surround me.
Lave me, ultimate waters.
The dark showed me a face.
My ghosts are all gay.
The light becomes me.^^
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If the technical risk of such poetry is that the poet defies or 
defeats the reader’s understanding, the emotional risk is that the 
poet practically loses a sense of his own identity. He is little 
more than a consciousness which speaks through the things and 
creatures he is describing. We are here at the heart of the Diony­
sian view of man. The poet as follower of the wild god breaks 
down the boundaries, abolishes the principium individuationis, 
substituting for it the unity of the self with nature. But we may 
properly ask, if the boundaries established by the self are to be 
broken down in order that direct participation in the divine power 
which pervades all may be experienced, what of the self who 
remains the focus of experience? This is precisely the problem 
which stands at the center of the Dionysian view of man. The 
Dionysian way is unable to offer an adequate doctrine of the 
person. The breakthrough of the self into nature is also a break­
up of the self. It imposes on the poet a terrible burden, for he is 
ever on the edge of what Rimbaud described as the systematic 
dereglement de tons les sens. “One does not know whether to 
rejoice with the poems or sympathize with the poet.” It seems 
certain that the disintegration which bore strange and marvelous 
f^o^thke’s poetry also caused tragic breakdowns in his 
life. And it is not surprising to see him in the late phases of 
his career tending to moderate his acceptance of the Dionysian 
way.
But even with this moderation, what prevails in Roethke’s 
work as in no other modern poet of my acquaintance is a sense of 
empathy with the things of this world. We find in him what 
Albert Schweitzer would have identified as a reverence for life, 
a profound sense of partnership with the whole of creation. An 
instance of this sense of partnership is expressed in a poem 
titled “The Meadow Mouse”:
In a shoe box stuffed in an old nylon stocking 
Sleeps a baby mouse I found in the meadow.
Where he trembled and shook beneath a stick 
Till 1 caught him up by the tail and brought him in.
Cradled in my hand,
A little quaker, the whole body of him trembling.
His absurd whiskers sticking out like a cartoon-mouse.
His feet like small leaves.
Little lizard-feet.
Whitish and spread wide when he tried to struggle away.
Wriggling like a miniscule puppy.
Now he’s eaten his three kinds of cheese and drunk from his 
bottle-cap watering-trough —
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So much he just lies in one comer,
His tail curled under him, his belly big 
As his head; his bat-like ears 
Twitching, tilting toward the least sound.
Do I imagine he no longer trembles 
When I come close to him?
He seems no longer to tremble.
But this morning the shoe-box house on the back porch is empty. 
Where has he gone, my meadow mouse.
My thumb of a child that nuzzled in my palm? —
To run under the hawk’s wing.
Under the eye of the great owl watching from the elm-tree,
To live by courtesy of the shrike, the snake, the tom-cat.
I think of the nestling fallen into the deep grass.
The turtle gasping in the dusty rubble of the highway.
The paralytic stunned in the tub, and the water rising, —
All things innocent, hapless, forsaken.
Roethke was not a poet to blink the cruelty, the pathos, the 
haplessness of existence. It is a world in which the mouse lives 
under the shadow of the hawk’s wing, in which the paralytic lies 
stunned in the tub, the water rising. But neither was he a poet to 
react simply with bitterness and revulsion to the inexplicable 
character of fate. Roethke’s poetic legacy is a basic optimism 
about the divine character of nature itself in an age in which 
many of us have lost the ability to live with nature, to comprehend 
its greatness, or feel its power. His desire to live with nature 
recalls an anecdote by the theologian, Paul Tillich:
A Chinese emperor asked a famous painter to paint a 
picture of a rooster for him. The painter assented, but said 
that it would take a long time. After a year the emperor 
reminded him of his promise. The painter replied that after 
a year of studying the rooster he had just begun to perceive 
the surface of its nature. After another year the artist 
asserted that he had just begun to penetrate the essence of 
th is kind of life. And so on, year after year. Finally, after 
ten years of concentration on the nature of the rooster, he 
painted the picture — a work described as an inexhaustible 
revelation of the divine ground of the universe in one small 
part of it, a rooster.
We may compare the emperor’s wise patience and the painter’s 
saintly contemplation of an infinitely small expression of the 
divine life with the patience and wisdom of a poet such as 
Roethke. What his poetry says to those of us who are exploiters
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of the real or facers of fact is that the whole of life is a field 
of revelation” to those who have the ears to hear and the eyes 
to see. It was not within Roethke’s vocation as a poet to express 
his vision in theological formulae. In one of the last and finest 
poems of his career, however, the poet seems to have expressed 
the attitude towards the whole of life to which his art had all 
along been intending. We conclude with a quotation of the last 
lines of Roethke’s magnificent “The Abyss,” in which the poet’s 
happiness seems wholly earned and wholly credible:
I thirst by day. I watch by night.
I receive! I have been received!
I hear the flowers drinking in their light,
I have taken counsel of the crab and the sea-urchin,
I recall the falling of small waters.
The stream slipping beneath the mossy logs.
Winding down to the stretch of irregular sand.
The great logs piled like matchsticks.
I am most immoderately married:
The Lord God has taken my heaviness away;
I have merged, like the bird, with the bright air.
And my thought flies to the place by the bo-tree.
Being, not doing, is my first joy.l^
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TURKISH PORTRAITS
Ahmet —
A frail, thin, passionate boy.
In rectangular silver wire rims.
Separated from any knowledge of his heaU 
Thinks girls are silly to talk of love 
On Saturday dancing or cinema dateso 
He finds Adana boring and tiresome.
And feels perfectly aware of himselfc
Semi —
A clumsy boy in khaki jacket
And huge tortoise rimmed spectacles.
The irregular face of a musician — 
direct eyes 
slightly shy 
earnest 
controlledo
His hair curls
And does not cover his earso
5akir Akdemir —
In the library he was playing with 
A faded pink roseo
I wanted to take it from him.,
— Kathleen Mattos Wooley
4S
AFTERNOON DACKPORCIIED
When late evening comes 
Before seven,
Bringing its layered 
Nostalgias,
And nothing is ready 
To take in body warm nights.
And skin warmed lunchsack days.c 
Early daylilies relax green fists 
Into long piano-player’s hands.
Nostrils, empty of the smell of charcoaled steak 
For a season seven years long.
Sweat roses in sniffs.
Lazy whiffs of remember.
Second times mix 
A complex harmony —
Ragtime syncopations.
Sophistications on a theme.
Reverberations fine tune,
Add the middle ranges.
Rest,
For the tension shadowed 
Detail
In the Wholes.
- Kathleen Mattos Wooley
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TEXTURES
Sunlight slides under the curtain 
Over sheets turned back,
And across the floor,
Awakening oriental patterns 
In its way„
Sunlit brass is not a solid
But a water-worked host of reflections
Imprisoned within an arbitrary shape.
Around which kings with staves
Or flowers
March or flow or stand.
Intensities 
Cannot stay.
But move in an exchange of shape.
Touched by sun.
Shadows
Intensify the surface.
And go.
— Kathleen Mattos Wooley
THOUGHTS ABOUT MY PARENTS
Once, I never knew the poignant
Weightlessness
Of their evanescence.
Standing about holding drinks 
And laughing.
Or reading newspapers 
Or paperback books in bed.
They appeared 
Material enough.
— Kathleen Mattos Wooley
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LEOPOLD VON RANKE
In his book Debates with Historians, Pieter Geyl suggests, 
throu^ an ambivalent characterization penned by Lord Acton of 
Leopold Von Ranke (1795-1886), that he stands as “ ‘ . the
representative of the age which instituted the modem study of 
history. He taught it to be critical, to be colourless and to be 
new. We meet him at every step, and he has done more for us than 
any other man.’ ” Few deny the significance of Von Ranke’s 
contribution to the discipline of history. His prolific scholarship 
includes his History of the Popes, German History in the Times 
of the Reformation in Germany, A History of France, A History of 
England, and in his declining years the unfinished World History. 
A perusal of his History of England reveals the contributions of 
Von Ranke.
The historiographical principles which guided Leopold Von 
Ranke in the writing of the History of England are the basis for 
much of modern historiography. He contirubted to the discipline 
of history by his emphasis on the importance of objectivity, his 
use of primary sources, and more significantly his critical 
employment of them. In addition to these principles, he believed 
in a universal view of the course of history and he further devel­
oped the concept of historicism (later defined in this essay).
Von Ranke was a firm believer that history should accurately 
reveal the past (wie es eigentlich gewesen). This principle was 
the guiding aim for him in his work. Certainly Ranke s idea of 
history as revealing what actually happened was not new, but his 
approach and his eschewing all other purposes were new. In 
contrast with the Romantics, who like Ranke wanted to resurrect 
the past, he sought to approach such a task with detachment. 
Romantics like Jules Michelet (1798-1874) imposed their enthus^i- 
asms and prejudices on the period they were studying. Ranke s 
purpose was to obtain an impartial view of the past. For Von 
Ranke “the strict presentation of the facts, contingent and 
unattractive though they may be, was undoubtedly the supreme 
law.”
Whatever Von Ranke’s beliefs or intents, it is obvious that 
total objectively is neither possible nor desirable. The abso ute
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separation of writer and judge from his work denies the discipline 
of its real interest. In the mere selection of facts and in their 
arrangement Von Ranke imposed his own order on his history 
reflecting his bias. It is also clear that Von Ranke was moved by 
other convictions: e.g., his reaction to the French Revolution 
and his belief in God’s role in the processes of history condi­
tioned by his Lutheran faith. Conservative in his political be­
liefs, Von Ranke resisted the pure power policy and tendency to 
totalitarianism contained in revolutionary ideas. Despite his 
claims to objectivity, he was guided in explaining historical 
development by his belief that God’s handiwork was apparent in 
history. For Von Ranke “history is religion” or at any rate, there 
was a connection between them, for Von Ranke all human 
activity of intellectual importance originated in some way from 
God. So too, the political life of all nations was guided by 
religious ideas. Von Ranke wrote “ . . . the ecclesiastical 
element in English history appears at every step.”
The German historian sought out the facts through extensive 
use of primary sources and, more significantly, in the use of 
archival materials. He worked untiringly in the archives of 
Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Rome, and Venice. The result of this work 
was the turning up of a vast amount of diplomatic correspondence. 
His extensive use of these materials helps to explain his nearly 
exclusive interest in political and diplomatic history. His use of 
these sources also gave him a greater understanding of the 
balance of power politics in Europe. Von Ranke believed that 
each State in its rivalry and conflict kept the European community 
and civilization in being. Examples of such diplomatic corres­
pondence appear in his History of England, both in his citations 
in the narrative and in his appendix which is a critical analysis 
of his source material. Although Ranke’s reliance on these 
sources was greater than that of previous historians, the utiliza­
tion of this primary material was not new. Von Ranke’s most 
significant contribution was in the way he used them.
In order to discover whether these primary materials were 
accurate. Von Ranke subjected them to criticism. In reviewing a 
document, he attempted to seek out the “personal equation,” 
writes Harry Elmer Barnes in his History of Historical Writing. 
The Germans call this “Author-Kritik.” In other words, Ranke 
sought to understand the “personality, tendencies, activities and 
opportunities” of the author of the document. In this way Ranke 
established one of the guiding principles of modem historiography.
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Ranke used two contemporary accounts by the English historians 
Clarendon and Gilbert Burnet in writing his History of England. 
In using these sources he was critical of their motives. Ranke 
asserted that although Clarendon’s “ . . . sketches of character 
are unequaled in the English language: they are by no means free 
from political colouring and party bias.” He also charged that 
Burnet had changed the second draft of his History of His Own 
Times because of “deliberate ill will against the Tories.” Ranke 
sums up Burnet’s history as “. . . a strange mixture of rumor and 
error with knowledge and truth, of credulous partiality and the 
effort to be impartial.” Ranke ultimately rejects the objective 
truth of Burnet’s facts. Two other forms of criticism used by 
Ranke were Dokument-Kritik (assessing the genuineness of a 
document) and Sack-Kritik (assessing the credibility of what is 
reported).
Fritz Stem, in his Varieties of History, suggests that Ranke’s 
stress on the importance of accurate factual data has led some 
critics, like the Anglo-American historians, to accuse him of 
particularism (overemphasis on fact and scientific inquiry). Stem 
further points out that these critics have forgotten Ranke’s ‘own 
insistence on a universal history.” Ranke wrote “ . . . the 
discipline of history — at its highest -- is itself called upon, and 
is able, to lift itself in its own fashion from the investigation 
and observation of particulars to a universal view of events.” In 
his History of England Ranke looked upon James II’s attempts to 
re-introduce Catholicism as “ ... a definite stage in the general 
struggle” in Europe in 1688. Furthermore, Ranke observed that 
the internal conflict in England “ . . . thus lost its insular 
character and entered into connexion with the ^eat religious and 
political conflict which then in various ways divided Europe, and 
appears as an essential part of it.” Ranke did not merely lay 
before the reader the bare facts, but he sought to discover the 
connexions between them. Significantly, Ranke was aware of the 
interrelatedness of the affairs of Europe. Ranke refers to the 
states and empires of Europe as belonging “ ... to the general 
community of peoples of the west.”
Another principle used by Von Ranke was his belief that 
history was a continual process of development. This concept is 
known as historicism. This idea had guided the Romantics and 
was further developed by U.anke. Historicism replaced the appeal 
to reason with an appeal to history. Borrowing from the^Romantics 
Von Ranke rejected the classicist emphasis on reason ... as a
53
motive force and as the instrument for the unravelling of the 
process of history.” Ranke asserted that each age and nation had 
its own characteristics and is dominated by a prevalent set of 
ideas (Zeitgeist), but the developments of each age had an 
“organic cohesion and a continuity” with the past. Ranke wrote 
that “ . . . the events have been irrevocably prepared by the past, 
and developed then by their own impulses.” With this concept in 
mind, Ranke could conclude that William Ill’s position was a 
further development of the position of Queen Elizabeth almost 
100 years earlier.
Ranke’s concept of historical development also emphasized 
the role of ideas in history. Pieter Geyl implies that it is here 
that we touch on Ranke’s inspiring value to the study of history. 
In Ranke’s description of the House of Orange, he relates that 
the conflicts of great ideas helped determine the course of 
personal ambition of its princes. The historian further points out 
that the relation of Protestant and Catholic ideas decided the 
course of all of England’s foreign affairs and by extension the 
idea of balance of power.
His most serious weakness resulted from his over-dependence 
on primary sources.In this sense he restricted himself to political 
and diplomatic history. Consequently, he neglected the areas of 
economic and social history where there were fewer reliable 
sources.
Despite these shortcomings, Ranke still stands as the master 
of historical scholarship. G. P. Gooch, in his History and His­
torians in the Nineteenth Century, succinctly states that Ranke 
“ . . . was the greatest historical writer of modern times, not 
only because he founded the scientific study of materials and 
possessed in an unrivaled degree the judicial temper, but because 
his powers of work and length of life enabled him to produce a 
larger number of first-rate works than any other member of the 
craft.”
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COLLECTION
Thru the pool 
of time
I have travelled 
collecting pebbles 
of knowledge 
and friendships 
and storing them 
in the secret spots 
of mind and heart.
Waiting for someone 
to exchange them 
with
(like bubble gum cards)
gathering and storing.
until the collection is complete.
Joseph Epolito
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SPIRO
A fellow named Spiro 
Ofttimes was considered a hero; 
But they looked at his taxes 
And sharpened their axes —
Now Spiro, the hero, is zero.
James K. Rcty
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Albert Love joy 
“RIFF’’
An old sociological adage, now seldom discussed, points out 
the very positive effect on children of the negative exemplars of 
public and private decorum. My socialization and that of other 
children in my small home town was thus affected. During our 
formative years we were positively and frighteningly influenced 
by these examples of “the bad seed.’’ One of them was Mr. Ruff 
SollinSo
“Rah, rah Ruff, rah, rah Ruff,” screamed the children as they 
ran from the pock-marked, red-gray faced and obviously inebriated 
Mr. Rollins. “Ruff,” as he was commonly and amiably called by 
his fellow townspeople, was a man of middle stature, of some 
slight obesity, of alcoholically deteriorating physique, and of 
chronically unemployed status, who lived, yes, who literally 
lived, in the loft of a boathouse alongside the village wharf, lliat 
he never fell into the deep cold water and drowned could only 
have been providential — perhaps he was being preserved for the 
socially useful role he was playing as the character “whom not to 
become like ” as we kids passed from childhood to late adoles­
cence.
“Ruff’ had the misfortune not only to be a victim of alcohol­
ism, but also to have this disease in the nobly experimental 
Prohibition era! With legal beverages unattainable and with 
Canadian and domestic bootleg liquor occasionally bringing 
blindness or death, impecunious “Ruff was forced to buy 
“canned heat,” Sterno, which is still used to heat carafes and 
fondu pans. With this and other poisons of his preference, which 
must have had an absolutely devastating effect upon his internal 
organs and processes, “Ruff” fed his habit. So it was, then, that 
unbelievably though innocently cruel children would taunt and 
tantalize this sad hulk of misbegotten humanity. And because he 
had another weakness, namely that as he became intoxicated, his 
stuttering became more pronounced, the children would devilishly 
mimic his speech impairment and he would angrily chase them in 
his towering but largely impotent rage and frustration. Who knows? 
Perhaps this attention by these pint-sized tormentors was a kin 
of recognition of the peculiar niche he occupied in our sober, 
puritanical, self-righteous village as that horrid old village 
drunk!”
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I have often wondered whatever became of “Ruff” because 
some of us certainly owe him a kind of debt — some would say 
he left us a malignant heritage at that — a debt of gratitude for 
personally exhibiting how far a person can fall when alcohol is 
his master and how hellish the young pimple-faced hounds of 
heaven can be in their ridicule and debasement of an unfortunate 
human being.
Today “Ruff” would, of course, be recognized as someone 
needing medical and psychiatric assistance and the strong 
empathic support of the “significant others” of a local A.A. 
chapter or similar group. But in the days of my youth he was 
thought of as just another cast-off and wretched derelict of 
small-town society where every citizen’s foibles and virtues were 
catalogued in the minds of morally unbending Yankee townfolk.
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0. Amos
THOUGHTS ON TEACHING AND LEARNING
From the Teacher to the Learner:
Self-Discovery is Learning, too
I am continuing to discover who I am. Some of what I am, I 
like and want to keep. Some of what I am, I would like to change 
and I will and can change! Some of what I am I cannot change. 
Since I am discovering who I am. I perceive that you are discover­
ing things about yourself, too. Let’s decide together that we will 
respect each others’ needs to discover, to grow, to change. This 
inherent need to discover ourselves should be a unifying bond 
among us, and an enriching learning experience.
Let the learners teach today!
The Teacher is a Learner
When I teach, I want to learn something. If none of my students 
create anything new and different, I get bored. If no students say, 
“Gee, I never thought of that before,” I feel disappointed. If no 
student says to me, “Wait one minute, I don’t know if I agree with 
that,” I get careless with my own opinions. F'ortunately, I have 
not had much chance to get bored, disappointed, or careless!
Teaching is not a job or an occupation; it is a relationship, a 
way of thinking, a way of being.
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William T. Hamilton
NOTES FROM A SABBATICAL JOURNAL
My sabbatical in the fall of 1972 was devoted to the study of 
the city — in literature and in reality. I kept a journal, but in the 
desultory way I find so objectionable in my students, not in the 
orderly write-something-everyday fashion I so sincerely recom­
mend. The following is a selection from that journal. I haven t 
included every note I made, nor have I hesitated to revise and 
update some of the ideas I’ve continued to think about.
I spent much of my sabbatical in two cities in which I lived a 
large part of my childhood — Washington and London. They are 
unquestionably great cities, particularly London, but they are 
not, I think, being particularly well treated by the passage of 
time. So my nostalgia about these places was made somewhat 
melancholy (as nostalgia usually is) by a sense of loss. There 
is, I believe, a kind of centrifugal force in the modern city, in 
modern life generally, that threatens any entity as delicate as a 
human community.
Significantly, the fall of 1972 was a political season, and, 
though my journal doesn’t always reflect it, I was aware that an 
election was going on. Politics is of central importance in the 
fate of the city, and it seems to me hard to look back on that 
election without feeling that our system demonstrated a kind of 
moral and ideological bankruptcy that fall. What can the men who 
won be said to believe, if they were prepared to behave in the 
ways they apparently did? And what can be said of an opposition 
that could not effectively oppose such men?
The idealism that built Washington, that animates much of the 
American literature that speaks of the city, was profoundly 
absent in the political city of 1972. Politics and community — 
they are in a sense synonyms — are terms with moral imperatives 
behind them. The contemporary problem is to find a new moral 
dimension to the planning of human communities, or to rediscover 
the old ones.
September 23, 1972
Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C.
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Sitting on a bench in the circle. This is my second day in 
Washington: it took longer to get organized and out of Westerville 
than I had hoped. It is going to take awhile to get this journal 
moving in useful directions, but I am beginning to see what I can 
accomplish on this sabbatical. The question boils down to what 
extent the city — this city — is livable for me, and how far my 
experience is applicable to any one else.
A couple of observations so far. I am staying with Dick and 
Dot McKinney, Otterbein graduates who live on Capitol Hill, 
perhaps ten blocks from the capitol. I have wanted to believe 
that the crime problem in this city was exaggerated: after all, as 
much as I have a hometown, this is it, and one wants to believe 
that one’s home is livable. So far the evidence is not good. The 
McKinneys, with John Muster, have bought an attractive old town 
house which they are remodelling in a very imaginative way. The 
locks on the doors are among the most impressive features. An 
old man was beaten and robbed of his watch across the street 
from their house at two o’clock in the afternoon the day before I 
arrived. Dot never goes out at night by herself, Dick seldom. It 
takes Dot fifty minutes to an hour to get home from her job here 
at the Circle: a distance of about three miles.
On the other hand there is this circle. Several great avenues 
converge here — Massachusetts, probably the most important 
diplomatic address in the world, Connecticut, etc. An interesting 
piece of sculpture — a fountain — forms the center of the circle. 
It is a place of incredible life: students, office workers, tourists. 
On this cool but sunny autumn afternoon, the benches are nearly 
all full. I suppose there are pickpockets around, but a crime more 
violent than that seems highly unlikely: there are too many 
witnesses.
It is probably a sign of our times that I’ve begun thinking 
about the city in terms of urban crime. The typical urban 
crime is probably mugging: a peculiarly unpleasant form of 
assault of person and property. I suppose there is plenty of 
scholarship on the causes of such crime, but it ought to be pos­
sible to imagine the motives, on the assumption that both the 
mugger and I are human, swept by the same passions, or perhaps 
merely bored by the same modern condition.
What, then, from the base of pure speculation, might be the 
motives of a mugger?
61
1. Excitement. For the kid in the city, mugging must offer 
some of the challenge of hunting or fishing: a demonstration of 
courage, prowess, and strength. If we’re inclined to think it 
doesn’t take much courage to beat up an old man, how much does 
it take to shoot a deer? We have whole battalions of middle-aged 
suburbanites arguing for the character-building qualities of 
squirrel-hunting and a real shortage of apologists for mugging.
2. A need for money. If you’re in debt, need a fix, a new pair 
of tires, a turtleneck sweater, whatever — a quick hit and you may 
be able to raise what you need.
3. I’m inclined to think that both of these motives are pretty 
powerful, but I don’t think that they cover the ground. There is 
also obviously a strong sense of injustice operating in a ghetto 
teenager. Society does little or nothing for you, so why should 
you observe its guidelines, which were not designed for your 
benefit anyway? Anti-social (the word is exactly right) behavior 
becomes a way of striking out at the enemy.
Th ese may be very literary motives, and they may be quite 
wrong. What is troublesome is that, in spite of the attention 
politicians give to “crime-in-the-streets” as an issue, little 
attention is paid to these — or any other — motives. What if we 
started at this end in trying to reduce crime in American cities? 
How would we proceed?
1. Excitement. Could we create living environments that were 
so interesting that no one needed to resort to interpersonal 
violence simply as a way of achieving a thrill? If we could, we 
might solve other problems as well.
2, The financial motive. With the will, this would be the 
easiest to solve. This is a profligate society. Our generosity to 
such institutions as Lockheed and Penn Central must be winning 
us points in some paradise. Why not simply set up inner-city loan 
offices, federally financed, where you could borrow up to fifty 
dollars on your signature? We no doubt would lose some money, 
but crime is expensive too. And, as a loyal and indebted member 
of the middle class, I’m aware of a strange thing: how responsible 
and socially respectable a big burden of debt makes one. Who 
knows where I’d be without a mortgage and an outstanding bal­
ance on my BankAmericard?
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3. The sense of injustice. By the far the toughest. This re­
quires, somehow, that we create in the most down-trodden a sense 
of participation in “national goals.” In this election year, we 
seem farther from ever from doing so: we seem to have no such 
goals worthy of the name.
Monday, September 25, 1974
Thomas Jefferson Reading Room, Library of Congress
Great as it is, why is one allowed to smoke in this part of the 
Library? The tobacco lobby in Congress? Or, more poetically and 
less likely, because Jefferson was a tobacco-planter?
I am reading Ian McHarg’s Design with Nature. He talks of 
the nuclear engineers as “the destroyers.” He continues, “If 
life ends, then let us await the death of the sun. We must know 
these men and their views. If they are like the first innocent 
astronaut, then may they yet gain that vital deference for this 
immense journey.” He calls them “archaic men who still retain 
the vengeful view of man against nature, who can carelessly 
ignore the fruits of evolution and extinguish all life as the remedy 
for human contests.”
And of the city: “We can think of the city as a great zoo to 
which the gregarious animals voluntarily make their daily way by 
familiar trails to enter their cages, rather like the starlings 
whose penchant for bridge trusses is uncomfortablfti similar.” A 
bleak picture of modern urban man, but not an implausible one. 
Suburban man follows longer trails, goes to more trouble, to get 
from cage to cage.
McHarg makes an ecological comparison of a sand dune and a 
mature forest which has grown on an ancient dune. This is a 
remarkable passage, with far-ranging implications, not only for 
an understanding of ecology but for the way things are put to­
gether generally. The sand dune is simple, primitive: few species 
of plants and animals, few symbioses, few interrelationships. 
The forest is complex — many of each of these. All of this has 
importance in considering the difference between a rich human 
environment and an impoverished one. Since he links the forest 
with evolution and the dune with retrogression, the values of the 
two modes become even more striking.
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October 2, 1974 
Thomas Jefferson Room
We talk about “time to think” as a luxury, something we get 
instead of money, for all of us know, deep in our hearts, that if 
we weren’t professors we’d be rich industrialists, or best-selling 
novelists, or highly paid attorneys. But the notion that contem­
plation is a luxury seems to be based on the assumption that 
thinking is an entirely pleasurable activity. Alone with books 
and paper for several weeks in a great library — if one is thinking 
— one is confronted not only withpleasure but with doubts: doubts 
about your very capacity to think adequately, for one thing. Lost 
is the chance to read for a few hours and then dash into a class­
room and, before you yourself have been touched, to pass a set of 
half-formed conclusions to a group of students who will at least 
assure that you are not alone with an idea.
My reading to date has developed one exciting, terrible idea. 
It sounds like a commonplace, but for me it has its power. First, 
of all the problems facing this society the most critical is the 
crisis of the city. If we fail to make Washington and New York 
livable, the contagion that spreads from their death will destroy 
us in small town and suburb as well; our failure to contain drugs 
and crime in the inner city is evidence for this proposition. The 
idea itself comes primarily from Ian McHarg’s book. We have 
available to us a set of ecological principles that would allow us 
to create a livable landscape. It would be characterized by its 
extreme complexity. Such simplistic notions as neighborhood-by­
neighborhood zoning would be eliminated. To a great extent, 
where we locate our houses and factories and parks would depend 
on the most critical natural capacities of a given place — its 
relation to aquifers and foundation rock and regional airsheds. 
We have available, at least in its broad outlines, the scientific 
knowledge to build such an environment. But most analyses of our 
present cultural and political characteristics suggest that we will 
probably not build it. Instead we will build where the maximum 
financial return can be realized, and we will continue gradually 
to reduce the potential of the land to replenish our supplies of 
food, clean air and water and, more vaguely, our spirits.
McHarg's first chapter deals with the comparatively simple 
planning needs involved in developing the great Atlantic barrier 
beaches - the Jersey Shore, Assateague, Cape Hatteras. It can 
be demonstrated that one must leave the primary dunes with their 
complex of grasses absolutely inviolate - this grass we really 
must not walk on. Only this dune protects the shifting structure 
of the barrier. It allows woods to grow behind it on the secondary 
dune and in the trough behind the dune. It protects the shallow 
bay behind the barrier, and this bay is the nursery for an incred­
ible quantity of food resources — fishes and shellfishes of many 
kinds.
At one time, I had visited the Atlantic coast of Maryland and 
Virginia frequently, but with only a fragmentary knowledge of 
these principles. I went back to Assateague last week, impelled, 
I want to insist, not only by my unscholarly desire for a dip in 
the ocean, but also by the wish to look at the dunes with my 
newly educated eyes. Assateague is all right: development is 
behind the dune, and not very intensive there. The Park Service 
has provided crossovers to the beach that keep the dunes rela­
tively inviolate and still permit intense recreation on the beach. 
Assateague, as I say, is all right.
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The next day I drove north along the coast, from Ocean City 
almost to Dover, Delaware. If one wants an indication of how 
unlikely we are to build according to the best knowledge we have, 
he need go no further than this stretch of coast. For miles and 
miles, the dunes have not only not been protected, they have 
been systematically bulldozed, stripped of grasses, frequently 
even levelled. Great ugly concrete condominiums, some of them 
near skyscraper proportions, have replaced the grasses. The bay, 
that crucial food source, has also been violated. Instead of the 
shallows that in my memory teemed with clams and fish and 
waterfowl, we now have landfill (bulldozed, I suppose, from the 
dunes across the highway) and deep sterile canals for motorboats. 
Instead of what nature built to protect a fragile marine environ­
ment, we have what man made to make a buck.
Henry James, The American Scene (1905), writing about the 
Jersey Shore: “Here was the expensive as a power by itself, a 
power unguided, undirected, practically unapplied, really exerting 
itself in a void that could make it no response, that had nothing — 
poor gentle, patient, rueful, but altogether helplessly void! — to 
offer in return.” This of the relatively casual development of the 
coast for vacation homes in the late nineteenth century.
October 3, 1974 
Library of Congress
One of the things that characterizes a good piece of fiction is 
its density. This density is so important that we hardly notice 
its presence. A good story begins immediately with sentences 
that are packed with nuance and detail. My experience both as an 
editor and a failed writer suggests that this indispensible rich­
ness, so easy when we read it, is one of the most difficult things 
there is for a writer to obtain.
It is a parallel characteristic that makes a good city — or a 
good city neighborhood. Dupont Circle is an example. There is, 
first of all, the circle itself, graced with a fountain, statuary and 
many benches. The suburb, the small town — Otterbein College — 
never seem to understand how important benches are. In Dupont 
Circle, they attract old men, drunks, lovers, students and an 
occasional tourist who is wise enough to realize that he may get 
a better sense of the city sitting here than by riding around in a 
tour bus being harangued about the White House. The circle 
itself — a visual and social focal point — is where avenues and
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people meet.
Then the avenues radiating out from the circle and the smaller 
streets which in a moment’s walk carry one from the bustle of the 
circle into tree-shaded neighborhoods which possess some of the 
most elegant, practical domestic architecture in the world. Back 
on these streets are fine little office buildings, the incredibly 
warm and charming Phillips Gallery, a little museum of African 
art, a residence for foreign students and so on and on. The 
avenues have liquor stores, sidewalk cafes, bookstores, drug 
stores, groceries, boutiques, framing shops — even gas stations. 
Pedestrian traffic is heavy, multi-purposed, surely a sign of 
urban health.
Crucially, the scene is complex. An intense variety of activi­
ties go on. Mothers wheel their babies, beggars look for hand­
outs, businessmen and scholars buy cigarettes and papers, and, 
in the fall anyway, a pair of young black boys peddle chrysanthe­
mums from a handcart.
It is a charming scene: it is also a practical scene: needs are 
met, money changes hands, visual appetites are satisfied. I don t 
know how the crime rate in Dupont Circle compares with that 
elsewhere in the city, but I suspect it is markedly lower than in 
a number of other areas. Certainly, the level of healthy stimula­
tion is higher. Both ghetto (at least the ones I’ve looked at here 
and in Columbus) and suburb are marred by their very lack of this 
kind of social density.
Take a look at the typical Westerville suburb. It has no social 
density. Even the cheapest suburb, with the smallest lots, has a 
very low population density compared to the area around Dupont 
Circle. There is, if you look closely, practically no pedestrian 
traffic: there are few people; more sadly, there is no place for 
them to go. There may be, however, quite a bit of motor traffic. 
It is almost certainly leaving or returning from some outside 
place where needs may be met. The suburb itself meets only one 
need — shelter. The suburbanite doesn’t need to buy chrysanthe­
mums: if he likes them, in the fall he has his own. But since he 
won’t be walking to the flower vendor, he won t be meeting any­
one on his way. He won’t be tempted into an art gallery or a 
bookstore. The suburbs take great pride in the fact that one is 
rather unlikely to see a drunk or a beggar on the street. One 
won’t see anyone else, either.
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To get away from the drunk and the beggar — and, let us 
admit, from much worse than that — we have built suburbs in the 
countryside, little paramilitary bases in defense of the good life. 
(Some of them, Tve read recently, actually have walls around 
them and guards — hardly para-military at all anymore.) But, 
though our children and ourselves have thus gained a modest 
margin of physical safety (modest because crime is showing a 
great resistance to being confined to the city), we have at the 
same time granted ourselves intellectual safety, a freedom from 
fear of new ideas, new risky encounters.
Does the suburb have to be like this? Does it have to have its 
present kind of deadly monotony? Can’t we have miniature Dupont 
Circles in our bedroom towns? Could — awesome thought — 
Otterbein College become such a place, and become so vital to 
Westerville and the northern suburbs of Columbus that the com­
munity simply couldn’t afford to let her die?
How could we fill this role? What could we do for the suburban 
environment in which history has set us? Obviously, in the fore­
seeable future, Otterbein is not going to sell flowers, wine, and 
cheese, though the closing of an old liberal arts college here in 
Washington yesterday reminds me that some of us may be selling 
apples some day.
October 4, 1974 
Columbia, Maryland
So far — and I haven’t seen much but the Mall — Columbia 
gives the impression of being like living in a bigger and better 
Northland. The shopping center has its amenities, but I’ve seen 
no bookstore.
There is some interesting architecture, and the lake and its 
waterfront is attractive, though not as attractive as I had hoped.
The place is extremely clean — Lewis Mumford would like 
that. And maybe some of the negative factors associated with 
that cleanliness will diminish in time. At present, it seems just 
a bit sterile. Margaret’s image of the restaurant with its morning 
bread delivery stacked unwrapped on the sidewalk is instructive, 
I think. This place may lack that kind of intriguing incongruity.
A nice little toy shop, however, that provided the opportunity
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to buy trinkets for the children.
October 6, 1972 
Library of Congress
Studs Lonigan. This has considerable value as a city novel. 
Students might be able to draw some conclusions about it similar 
to those raised by Maggie: the spiritual emptiness of the American 
urbanite as seen by the American urban writer.
At the point Vm now reading, Studs is having difficulties with 
women — as he does throughout the book. His problem seems to 
be that he has nothing to say to them, and no gentleness — in a 
somewhat Victorian sense of the word — with which to say it.
A problem of use with a novel like this: to what extent is the 
protagonist of a novel a type, whose characterization allows one 
to discuss the general implications of urban life, and to what 
extent is he a unique conception whose interest for the reader is 
personal, not sociological? This area might be worth exploring in 
a class.
We don’t know who decided that London would be a good place 
for a city, or even when. We do have fairly precise information for 
Boston, Washington, New York. That is a substantial difference 
between the American historical experience and the European.
October 26, 1972
What the city is, at its best, the liberal arts college must 
become. This is probably an impossible goal: the college is 
small, somewhat uniform in its purposes. The city is large, 
multiform, created by design and accident to perform a wi e 
range of functions. But, walking in Washington, I have been 
struck with envy by the multitude of students I see. Can we ever 
hope on the campus of an Ohio college to give our students what 
those city kids get just from being where they are? Probably not, 
but surely we must try.
What does the city give? Openness and risk. The city is intel­
lectually and socially dangerous; that is its great virtue. Espe-
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cially if you are young and open, it constantly threatens unearned 
kinds of balance. A book, a painting, a person you bump into - 
any of these things can destroy the cherished assumptions of a 
lifetime.
Fm exaggerating. One can wander through a city - Fve done 
it — without letting one’s defenses drop for a moment. But there 
are opportunities for openness here that may not be as apparent 
anywhere else.
Fve been reading Open Marriage. Surely the closures the book 
describes as confining conventional marriage are operative else­
where. One of the greatest problems that faces me as a teacher 
at Otterbein is that I am unable to shock a great many students, 
who come to me, it seems, already dead. (If you like the word 
“surprise” better than shock, please read it in.) Too many of the 
young adults we face across that yard or so and those years and 
books that separate us have apparently already given up. They 
have a kind of self-possession that is not based on knowledge, 
but on an assumption, picked up God knows where, that no know­
ledge, no new idea, can possibly do anything for them or touch 
them in any way.
This closedness threatens to destroy us, not only us as a 
college, but as a free society. If, as President Kerr suggests, we 
are going to study the suburb, we must first come to grips with 
this fact: that the great rise of the automobile-serviced suburb 
has occurred simultaneously with the triumph of television, the 
decay of true literacy in our young, and a kind of deadness of 
mind that, as a student of American literature and culture, I can 
find in no other era. Our students are terribly handicapped by 
coming from communities in which the prices of houses don’t vary 
by $5000 over a half-mile area, where nearly everyone chooses 
their evening’s entertainment from three nearly identical tele­
vision networks, where for the first ten years of their lives the 
only males they ever saw engaged in serious work were the 
mailman, the milkman, and the elementary school principal.
Back briefly to another idea in this journal — the sabbatical 
itself. Every other academic project has led to some clearly 
defined goal: a seminar paper, a dissertation, a lecture. I started 
out with the idea that this period of time must produce some
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publication: after all I’ve got my career to advance. I have writ­
ten one book review, but I would have done that anyway. I’ve 
written a fair amount in this journal. But my reading has not been 
narrow enough to lead to an article. I’ve been reading fiction, the 
Washington Post, philosophy, history, sociology, landscape 
architecture.
A possible lesson here: I may have got more out of this read­
ing, though I’m certainly not able to specify what, than I would 
have out of more traditionally directed scholarship. Is it possible 
that we close in our teachers (and thus our students) by insisting 
on directed research that always has in sight a definite end 
product? The rules of the academic game are such that one can­
not usually risk the kind of reading I’ve been doing. The conse­
quences of such rules may be the serious hampering of scholar­
ship so that it can only ask questions that can be, relatively 
quickly, answered in publishable form.
October 29, 1972
Last evening was an interesting one. The McKinneys had 
some friends from across the street over for an impromptu fondue. 
The husband is about to receive his dental degree at Georgetown 
University; the wife is a folklorist at Maryland. Good food, good 
talk. We talked a great deal about this neighborhood, the blacks 
who are being displaced, the vandalism in the Safeway. Jerry, 
the folklorist, commented that when they moved into the neighbor­
hood a year or two ago they felt somewhat threatened by the 
street life at night - the older residents sitting on the porches, 
the shouting back and forth from house to house. As outsiders, 
they found this somewhat puzzling and even threatening. As the 
neighborhood became increasingly white, this evening front- 
porch social life began to diminish. This fall, while I ve been 
here, the neighborhood is quiet at night, except for roving bands 
of kids, who are of course frightening to white adults.
We talked about vandalism. I mentioned early in this journal 
the mugging across the street from the McKinneys. I ve heard of 
no similar incident in the immediate area in the last month or so. 
But a trip to the local Safeway is an astonishing experience. 
Bands of black kids - usually three or four of them, ranging in 
age from about five to ten, dash through the aisles knocking down 
boxes and cans. Various policing efforts are made; they work as 
long as they are actively enforced. For an adult, the experience
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is disquieting — perhaps primarily in a literal sense. The noise 
is erratic, highly irritating. Sunday afternoon 1 went to the local 
laundromat at the other end of Stanton Park and watched a group 
of elementary-school aged girls kick the change maker until it 
yielded them a few quarters. There were about five people in the 
laundromat — finally, a young man, probably a law-school student, 
drove them off. A quick impression: this juvenile vandalism 
seems to be much less prevalent in small grocery stores and so 
on where the manager is in evidence than it is in large super­
markets and unattended laundromats. The latter, of course, are 
hideously bleak: the machines are in poor repair, trash baskets 
are seldom emptied, conditions are generally filthy.
To get back to the evening’s conversation, the Johnsons are 
generally very enthusiastic about life on Capitol Hill. They have 
a great deal of social curiosity of the kind that is probably neces­
sary to appreciate fully life in the city. They are interested in 
black dialect: Jerry is certain, from conversations in the course 
of doing business in the city as well as from her experience 
teaching at Howard, that there is a kind of expressiveness — 
poetry she called it — in this language, particularly among the 
young, that is lacking in middle-class youth. She had great 
success in getting students to write verse: she thought about 
40 per cent of her students were regularly writing poetry on their 
own. We talked about the depressing reality that this street 
language, with its vague origins in the rural South, must be at 
least to some extent repressed to make way for the “mainstream” 
language, if blacks are to find their way into trades and profes­
sions that have generally been dominated by whites. An idea for 
teaching: it might be very useful, perhaps in English 10, to 
discover some text that would allow us to introduce our white 
middle-class to this black language, not so they would have a 
second language, but so they would have some sense of the 
linguistic options that are in some sense a part of the American 
heritage. It might also be a useful way of suggesting the relation­
ships between language and culture, particularly in 10 which 
explores the relationship between the individual and society.
I advanced my theory that private ownership of certain essen­
tials dictates our lives in unfortunate directions: we each own 
automobiles instead of having decent public transportation, we 
all have TV sets instead of the best, most varied kinds of 
theater and cinema to “own” in common; in a suburb like Anne- 
hurst Village, we each have a back yard instead of adequate 
parks and open spaces. To some extent, I pointed out, the city
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still has not fallen into this trap: there is some public transporta­
tion, some theater, galleries, parks, etc. My friends found this 
idea interesting, but had some strong and cogent reservations. 
Dick pointed out that his present occupation involves him in 
travelling at odd times of the day to scattered parts of the city; 
his efficiency would be considerably lowered if he had to rely on 
buses; he could not afford to travel by taxi as a regular thing. 
Jim raised a more basic, and at the moment I think nearly unan­
swerable, objection. To give up one’s car — or any of the other 
objects in question — would be to throw oneself entirely on the 
mercy of the government, state, national, or local. The basic and 
quite justified distrust the citizen has for his leadership makes 
him very reluctant to put himself into governmental hands for 
things as vital as these. I am struck, over and over again, by 
how little we are going to be able to accomplish until we begin 
to develop governing institutions that are more responsive to our 
needs and that we can have more faith in.
Later in the evening, we — the McKinneys and I — went for a 
walk. A beautiful warm fall evening, and the streets were full of 
people. We walked from the McKinney’s house C St. N.E. to 
Pennsylvania Avenue, which on the Hill is a neighborhood of 
pleasant shops and restaurants. On a night like this, this part of 
the city is relatively safe: it meets the conditions for safety Jane 
Jacobs describes in her book. The Life and Death of Great 
American Cities. The safety factor is the pedestrian traffic: 
people are watching each other — it’s a principal urban recrea­
tion. The one danger spot I could see was north along Second 
and Third Streets, the avenues that run between the Library of 
Congress and its Annex and the other government buildings. Since 
these buildings are closed at night and since there are no stores 
or residences along them, there is little or no pedestrian traffic, 
and a person who ventured alone into these dark areas might well 
be in danger, in the unlikely event that he ran into a mugger who 
waited long enough to find a victim. One sign of the pathology of 
the city is these single-purpose areas — neighborhood is the wrong 
word for them — where government buildings, factories, whatever, 
totally dominate the scene. When these operations close down at 
night or for the weekend, a wasteland of dead space ensues. Thus 
public buildings, unless they function in ways that encourage 
pedestrian traffic, operate as a blight on the landscape. The 
more complex a neighborhood is, the better it is for human pur­
poses.
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We wound up at about midnight at a party up the street from 
the McKinneys. A lovely old house, restored into a most com­
fortable modern residence. The owners or renters of the house 
were four people; I never was quite sure which of the fifty or so 
people milling around actually owned the place. But the party 
was a pleasant minor example of the pleasures of city life. Con­
versation was interesting, varied, quiet, loud. People did not, as 
far as I could tell, talk about weather, pets, their children, or, 
except in terms of wide interest, their jobs. In some ways, of 
course, these restrictions were artificial: people do tend to have 
children, they certainly have weather.
October 31, 1972 
Fairfield, Pennsylvania
My subject, I discover, has become more than the city. What I 
am thinking about is what kinds of environments men can have 
that permit them to develop as fully as they can in directions 
that are most satisfactory to themselves. The city has some very 
serious problems. For example, none of the people Fve been 
talking to in the city have children, and, since all of them are 
relatively affluent, I strongly doubt that many of them will remain 
in the city when they do. And Bil Gilbert, my host here, was 
commenting the other night when I was discussing some of these 
matters with him that the usual city resident has to spend so 
much time making a living, doing his shopping and so on that he 
may have limited time to appreciate its resources. The city is 
also terribly expensive. As it stands now, it may be not a good 
place to live for any but the wealthy, the young, and the child­
less. It does, however, offer possibilities that might serve as 
models for alternative arrangements. None of these alternative 
arrangements, however, are going to realize their full potential 
unless they can cluster around functioning, healthy cities. A 
place like Columbia, Maryland, simply cannot provide everything 
its residents need for the fullest possible creative life.
sjc ^ ^
We could also live in hawk blinds. Bil Gilbert has trapped and 
banded hawks along the mountains for several years. I came up 
Monday night to accompany him on a trapping expedition, some­
thing I haven’t done in a number of years. We saw some hawks, 
though we didn’t trap any. The best part of the trip was meeting 
Robert Cantwell. Cantwell did a book on Alexander Wilson several
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years ago, and Bil introduced me to the book which led to my 
dissertation. So we talked about Wilson, but also about Heming­
way. Cantwell wrote two novels - in the ’thirties I think. He met 
Hemingway through Dos Passos, a mutual friend. Hemingway 
thought Cantwell would be his successor as the great American 
novelist, borrowed Cantwell’s only copy of the second book, 
which was never returned. We had a good long talk about ^^Big 
Two-Hearted River.” Cantwell had noticed, as I had, the absence 
of birds or bird songs or similar matters a sensitive man might 
have noticed in the woods. He had mentioned this to Dos Passos, 
who told him of course Hemingway was not interested in these 
things: he was never interested in anything he couldn’t kill.
Cantwell, after many years in the city, has finally moved to 
Bethlehem, Pa., where the air is cleaner than in New York.
But back to living in hawk blinds. Johnson’s comment on the 
man who is bored with London is bored with life has taken an 
ironic turn. These, Bil Gilbert and Cantwell, are professional 
writers, and writing is, has been anyway, inextricably connected 
with the city, where the publishers and the bookstores are. Yet 
how much of the good conversations, the actual writing, that 
makes a great literature has gone on in this country in country 
houses and hawk blinds. Bil maintains that he has found city 
people dull: too many of their ideas have come from the same 
newspapers, so they talk in cliches. City people, glutted with 
the minimal social contacts that come from rubbing elbows with 
too many people, have become insensitive to individuals. For 
really interesting conversation, he wants a country man.
November 12, 1972
I have thought for some time — probably even read it some­
where — that teachers suffer from a kind of missionary complex: 
they are continually oppressed by a kind of anxiety that they 
must get the ‘Truth” across to their students, and are devastated 
emotionally when they fail to convert all of the heathens under 
their charge. I do think, however, that the teacher does exert a 
kind of moral force or at least has that kind of responsibility.
♦
Start this idea over again: what I want to say is that, to a
75
certain extent, at least within the context of a single term in a 
given class, we probably cannot ask our students to be what we 
are unable to be. If we want students to be open to the joys and 
challenges of literature, we must somehow project such joy and 
challenge as something we experience ourselves in some genuine 
and dynamic fashion.
When we come right down to it, the best a college can probably 
offer, with the exception of a few facts and techniques that can 
be obtained more economically from books, is the opportunity to 
experience a kind of life that society as we now know it will 
probably not give them again. If the word had not been so badly 
debased, I would call that kind of life scholarship: an opportunity 
to live primarily in the mind — or in an unusual complex of intei> 
changes between felt experience and an intellectual framework 
with which to structure it. If this is so, we as teachers must 
show that we are able to do this, and, more Important, that we 
get some kind of joy from doing it. This is partly an emotional 
matter, a thing that can take place anywhere there is a teacher, a 
student and a few books. But there may be kinds of physical 
environments that make this more possible, more pleasurable, 
than others.
November 16, 1972
G. M. Trevelyan points out that, in the Middle Ages, the 
citizen had rural interests as well as urban. In some cases he 
grazed cattle and cultivated corn on lands outside the city. A 
1388 Parliamentary Statute required that journeymen and appren­
tices help bring in the harvest. “There was none of the rigid 
distinction between rural and urban which has prevailed since 
the Industrial Revolution. No Englishman then was ignorant of 
all country things, as the great majority of Englishmen are 
today.’’
November 19, 1972
I’m not sure whether I made much of it at the time in these 
pages, but it was interesting to note of the young vandals in the 
laundromat and the Safeway in Washington that they were really 
quite happy children: uninhibited, joyful, adventurous. This in 
spite of the fact that they were a great source of annoyance to
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their elders, particularly white. And in spite of the fact that 
these children are in considerable danger from the adult world: 
policemen, rapists, automobiles, and so on. The city slums are 
not the environment one would choose for one’s children, but the 
energy and the excitement one sees there are a challenge to our 
ideas about childhood.
November 29, 1972 
Paisley, Scotland 
9:30 a.m.
This was, it turns out, a good place to start, I wish I knew 
more about the town’s present function: it seems to be largely a 
suburb of Glasgow and a shopping/banking town. Chivas seems 
to have a plant here. I gather weaving is dead as a major industry.
We arrived at Prestwick at about 6 a.m. yesterday and immedi­
ately took the train here. That was somewhat unfortunate, since 
the sun didn’t rise until we got here and we missed what looked 
to be interesting countryside. But the train was marvelous: quick, 
comfortable, clean. Public transportation is remarkable here: 
buses go by our guest house and out to Renfrew P erry every few 
minutes. By contrast, there is very little automobile traffic; State 
Street in Westerville is much more crowded.
December 3, 1972
We’ve had a car now for two days — a Hillman Hunter, a large, 
very comfortable car. We drove down from Edinburgh through 
beautiful country, and were, fortunately, through the Cheviot 
Hills before dark. I wouldn’t have wanted to miss them. A bit of 
snow in patches on the peak. Old soft hills, like the Appala­
chians, but with heather instead of trees. Couldn’t find a satis­
factory hotel until we got to Newcastle, where we stayed in a 
rather nasty Bed and Breakfast place. Newcastle is a depressing 
place — the car has conquered there.
Durham yesterday - an absolutely awe-inspiring cathedral, 
and an interesting little town clustered around it. A fine bakery 
among other things. But no place to cash dollar traveller checks 
on a weekend.
Last night and tonight, at a lovely old guest house in Ripon,
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the site of a cathedral that is celebrating its 1300th anniversary 
this year. Today we drove through the Dales — Wensleydale, 
Wharfedale, Airedale, to Haworth, a bleak but lovely little village 
- the Brontes. First real literary stop (except, I guess. Paisley) 
that we’ve made. Something to talk to Jim Bailey about: Haworth 
is a suburb of Keighley, not far from Leeds, Manchester, Brad­
ford; these places must have been growing into their present 
ignominious reality in Emily’s time, but you wouldn’t know it 
from reading the book. An anti-urban novel, or merely an 
a-urban one?
The wild “dales” — terribly wild, but completely domesti­
cated by the old stone walls, which have blended into the scene 
completely.
December 4, 1972 
York
We came here more by accident than by design: this was the 
most convenient place to turn in the car. The cathedral was most 
impressive: they were rehearsing Haydn’s Creation in the Minster, 
and the combination of stone, glass, voices and orchestra was 
impressive indeed. Our landlord in Ripon was telling us that the 
extensive repairs that are being made on the Minster have led to 
some striking discoveries. Under the Minster is a network of 
underground waterways, built by the Romans, and the building 
itself is on a kind of raft foundation. He’s an interesting man 
himself: an electrician, apparently, who is fascinated with 
English history and geography. He visited Hadrian’s Wall this 
summer, and he was impressed by the way it follows and utilizes 
natural contours of the land. Not like modern engineering, we 
agreed.
These small cities — Durham, York, Ripon (about 12,000) — 
are very interesting. All of them are complete — it is hard to 
imagine what a resident of any of them would need to go to a 
bigger city for. All of them are cathedral towns — that may be 
their main source of income: in each case it provides a kind of 
center for the city, though only in York is the church near the 
geographical center. Durham and Ripon both have open air 
markets (Durham has a covered one, too), which conduct serious 
business — they’re not just quaint operations for tourists.
The cities all suggest a principle of city planning. Create a
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center — cathedral, university, market — build a wall or otherwise 
establish a perimeter for the city, and then control the population 
to fit those bounds. If the population extends beyond the limits 
that the city can contain, build another one someplace else.
Why? Because geographical compactness guarantees two 
things. One is that the facilities of the city will be accessible 
by foot to the inhabitants. The other is that the concentration 
will provide a sufficient population to support a variety of 
activities. Westerville cannot support a good bookstore, for 
example, because it does not have a sufficiently large population 
concentrated within and around who cannot, with the aid of an 
automobile, get to a bigger and better bookstore in Columbus. 
But Columbus is too diffuse to allow for much in the way of 
variety.
An interesting thing about these cities: concentration of 
competitors. There is a little street near the Minster here with 
several jewelry shops, several bookshops. One would think that 
you would want to have the only bookshop on a street or in a 
neighborhood. But reflection shows why this is not the case: one 
wants to have his shop where people look for that kind of shop. 
A sophisticated shopper is going to want to look at several 
jewelry shops before he buys a diamond ring: better have your 
shop among those he looks at.
Freeways: in England overpasses or elevated highways are 
called “flyovers.” When land is condemned for these monstros­
ities, the houses are not immediately torn down, so that in a 
place like Newcastle or Glasgow you drive past hundreds of 
empty buildings, right next to the motorway, real symbols of the 
march of progress.
December 6, 1972 
Oxford
Arrived here by train at about 1:00 p.m. yesterday, made the 
mistake of not immediately looking for a bed and breakfast, so 
we’re staying at a rather seedy place, quite a way from the center 
of the city. But it will serve. Spent the afternoon (and a lot of 
money — charged of course) at Blackwell’s various locations.
Today we rented another car, this time a mini at much lower 
rates, and drove over to the Cotswolds, our principle point of
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sightseeing being the village of Chipping Campden. The Cots- 
wolds are lovely, even at this time of year, and we’re anxious to 
see them in the spring. Trevelyan considers Chipping Campden 
the most beautiful village in England. I wouldn’t be surprised. It 
was a great international center of the wool industry in the 
Middle Ages, so considerable money went into its architecture, 
particularly its handsome “perpendicular” style church, in which 
I was most impressed with the commemorative brasses in the 
floor.
The village is now supported, apparently, by tourists, craft- 
shops and, Margaret suggests, old-age pensions. We stopped in 
one little rare-book shop (in hopes of buying a guide, which he 
didn’t have), and were met by its owner, obviously a refugee from 
somewhere in the larger world. In addition to collecting (and 
writing) books, he composes wry notices, in beautiful hand 
lettering, on tiny slips of paper, urging one not to shoplift, to 
complain if the stock seems inadequate, and so on. And he sings.
One of the great neglected natural resources is daylight. 
Margaret was told in the day-care center she visited in Paisley 
that the children were off getting their “ultraviolet” — treatments 
to make up for the sunshine deficiency. And we are beginning to 
find it somewhat depressing that it is full dark by 4:30.
December 10, 1972 
London, 6 p.m.
It is difficult to believe that this will be our fourth night in 
London. Our stay here has been exciting, exhausting, and de­
pressing in the sense that it is quite clear that there is not time 
to do anywhere near everything we’d like to do, I remember 
thinking as a child, when we lived here, that this was an incred­
ibly exciting place. It is even more exciting to be here a s an 
adult when one realizes that few of the cities of the world are as 
healthy as this one.
It is hard, we’ve found, to know where to start in seeing 
London; it is hard even to know where to start to catalog what 
I’ve seen and thought while I’ve been here. There has not been 
time to keep a journal: too great a sense that one must fill every
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Freshest in my mind this evening and as good a place to start 
as any is Kensington Gardens. Round Pond is one of my sharpest 
memories of my two childhood years here, and it was moving to go 
back there today after twenty-three years. The gardens, even in 
winter, are exquisite and, though somewhat diminished by time, 
the Pond is as exciting a place as I remember it. On this Decem­
ber morning there were only a few sailboats: on that spring or 
summer day of my childhood there must have been dozens, as well 
as complicated model steamboats running on methylated spirits 
and even, as I recall, an exquisite battery-operated submarine. 
One day I lost a boat here — a lovely blue-and-white wooden 
sailboat perhaps eighteen inches long. You set the sails and 
rudder of your boat and push the boat out into the pond and pick 
it up wherever it comes ashore, following it, yourself literally 
landbound but in imagination at the tiller of the little boat, around 
the perimeter. A sailboat, if it has a heavy enough keel to keep 
it from capsizing, always comes ashore; only the power boats, 
subject to engine failure, get stalled in the middle of the pond.
I watched my boat make a clean, straight course right across the 
pond, but by the time I was to it a rather sinister (in memory, 
anyway) man, twice my size, had it in his hands. I was unable to 
convince him to give it to me. It occurs to me that this was one 
of the very few really upsetting experiences I ever had during a 
childhood a large part of which was spent on the streets, subways 
and public places of large cities. My parents generously replaced 
the boat (it had been a rather expensive birthday present, I 
think), but we were unable to get another blue one, and had to 
settle for a red one, not quite so pretty.
As I say, there were only a few boys with their boats today. 
Also a few men with kites. These were interesting. At first we 
noticed only the kites, lovely things very high over the park. 
Only later did we attend to the fliers. These were middle-aged 
men (I saw one teenage boy, probably the son of one of them). 
They had a little sort of covered kiosk near the pond, a comfort­
able place to discuss the intricacies of kiting, set aside for them, 
probably by tradition rather than law.They had the most incredibly 
complicated and expensive-looking equipment: light, finely 
braided strings, elaborate wooden reels, canvas cases to fold 
their kites into — not to mention the kites themselves. Obviously 
kite-flying is not, in Kensington Gardens anyway, something one 
does for his children on a whim and with an investment of fifty
waking moment, because God knows when one will get back.
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cents some windy Saturday in March. England — London anyway — 
supports an incredible variety of hobbies, particularly for men, 
all of them taken with a kind of seriousness that I think is rather 
rare among Americans. It is a nation of railroad buffs (and they 
don’t only build HO gauge trains, but read histories, buy antique 
prints, and follow existing lines), pigeon fanciers, and kite 
fliers. It is hard to imagine anything more pleasant, in a quiet, 
undemanding way, than getting together with a few cronies to fly 
your kite on a Sunday afternoon — or anything more foreign to the 
American suburban tenor of life.
* *
The great virtue of foreign travel, even it if is to a country as 
much like ours as England is in many ways, is the opportunity it 
provides to see that people do live differently — that there is 
nothing inevitable about the way we live, and that we do have 
some choices. I think most of the time we have a tendency to 
believe that we have built our cities and towns in responses to 
laws of nature, and that we live as we do because it is the only 
way we possibly can live. Not true, apparently.
December 22, 1972 
Westerville
Though I try to convince students with literary pretensions 
to keep a journal, it is a hard habit to maintain. I’m back from 
England and now must try to set things down that ought to have 
been set down at the time. So these observations are going to be 
extremely miscellaneous.
Pubs. We were enthralled with them, all over England. They 
are a marvellous place to get a delicious, inexpensive lunch; it 
took us no time at all to get used to British beer. They perform 
some crucial social functions that I suspect are not filled in most 
American communities. One notable service they perform is to 
civilize the young. Kids may drink beer at the age of eighteen. 
At least in smaller communities — Ripon and Claygate in our 
experience — young people drink in the “local” in the presence 
of their elders. They learn a considerable amount of drinking 
etiquette, and though they are not apparently inhibited (they neck 
and hold hands, hug, etc.), there are certain kinds of behavior 
that obviously would not be tolerated. The same thing undoubt-
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edly applies to adults. We never saw an offensively intoxicated 
Englishman in a pub. Liquor is extremely expensive by the bottle, 
quite cheap by the drink in a pub. I wonder what the relative 
rates of alcoholism are in the two countries.
The local is also obviously a great marketplace of ideas and 
gossip. Few people stay long — a pint of bitter, or two, with some 
friends and then off. I ran into an American educator in a pub in 
Oxford, and stayed quite a while talking to him. The only locals 
who stayed as long as we did were a man and his wife, who sat 
in a corner of the lounge, he reading several newspapers, she 
doing her knitting. It was a remarkable scene of domestic tran­
quillity though they drank very little and apparently spoke not at 
all.
Graffiti — in men’s rooms, always political. No perverted 
advertisements (they are to be found quite openly on bulletin 
boards at newstands), only slogans like — the I.R.A.
Class. Still very apparent. It tried my democratic fisherman’s 
soul to realize that all good salmon and trout fishing is still 
privately owned.
Cities — ideal places seemed to be York, Winchester, Durham, 
big enough to be cities, with cathedrals and museums, but small 
enough not to be overpowering. But the magnetic power of London 
and New York undoubtedly have the same effect in both countries: 
they pull the most talented people to them and impoverish the 
smaller cities, a trend perhaps impossible to reverse.
April 22, 1974 
Westerville
In the process of making selections from this journal, I notice 
I left some avenues unpursued, and never got back to some ideas 
I meant to run down. Such was the hazard of the method.
I was in Washington briefly over the “spring” break. Two 
great construction projects are well advanced: the Metro subway 
system, which may give Washington for the first time a relatively 
decent system of public transportation, and the new FBI building. 
My architectural vocabulary is inadequate to describe the latter 
monstrosity, but there is an interesting pedestrian perspective
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on it from the corner of Tenth and Pennsylvania Avenue: a modest, 
very handsome statue of Ben Franklin in front of a great fortress 
of prefabricated concrete which, rumor has it will have half a 
dozen stories beneath ground level. Computers there will store 
information about us all, and the building will be functioning 
well before 1984. Franklin, for all of his faults, was a great 
urbanite, a lover of cities like Dr. Johnson, a useful citizen who 
founded a magazine and a postal system — sound contributions to 
community. What would this exemplar of civic virtue think of the 
colossus rising, so to speak, over his right shoulder?
Finally, as a useful exercise in modesty, here is an observa­
tion of Doris Lessing’s I came across today: “For one of the 
advantages of living in the suburbs of the world is that the 
commonplaces which are too tedious for repetition anywhere else 
come as overwhelming discoveries.”
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